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Abstract
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1 Introduction
People have limited cognitive abilities and are prone to various behavioral biases;
this is documented by ample evidence in the literature of marketing, psychology, and
behavioral economics. Thus, it is not surprising that the behavior of individuals may
not be consistent with the standard axioms of rationality.1,2 What shall a planner do if
he/she wants to implement a goal when the relevant information is distributed among
“predictably irrational” individuals?
The present paper provides an analysis of the theory of implementation under in-
complete information when individuals’ choices do not necessarily comply with the weak
axiom of revealed preferences (WARP), the key condition corresponding to the standard
axioms of rationality. Our results provide an important leap in behavioral mechanism
design as information asymmetries are inescapable in many economic settings.
In particular, we analyze mechanism design under incomplete information when in-
dividuals are allowed to display different types of behavioral biases in different states of
the world, such as falling for an attraction effect, displaying a status-quo bias or reveal-
ing cyclic preferences (as is the case when groups act as an individual), among others.
In doing so, we focus on full implementation and employ ex-post equilibrium (hereafter
EPE) as our main concept of equilibrium for the following reasons.
Full implementation of a predetermined social choice rule requires that the set of
equilibrium outcomes of the associated mechanism fully coincide with the given social
choice rule. On the other hand, partial implementation only requires that the prede-
termined social choice rule be sustained by an equilibrium of the mechanism; hence, it
1This is why the recent trend involving the use of behavioral insights in policy-making has been
growing stronger, implying an increased interest in adapting economic models to allow behavioral biases.
In particular, Thaler and Sunstein’s New York Times best-seller book Nudge has been influential guiding
real life policies. For instance, the Behavioral Insights Team, a.k.a. the Nudge Unit, has been established
in 2010 in the United Kingdom. In the United States, President Obama released an executive order
in 2015, emphasizing the importance of behavioral insights to deliver better policy outcomes at lower
costs and at the same time encouraging executive departments and agencies to incorporate these insights
into policy-making. Many countries and international institutions followed, there are now more than
a dozen countries besides EU, OECD, UN agencies, and the World Bank that integrated behavioral
insights into their operations (Afif, 2017). There is such a trend in the academic literature as well, e.g.,
Spiegler (2011) provides a synthesis of efforts to adapt models in industrial organization to bounded
rationality.
2We say that individuals’ choices satisfy the standard axioms of rationality whenever their choices
obey the weak axiom of revealed preferences, which is formalized in Footnote 11. Besides Nudge (Thaler
& Sunstein, 2008), two other New York Times best-seller books documenting various behavioral biases
leading to failure of the standard axioms of rationality are Predictably Irrational (Ariely, 2009) and
Thinking, Fast and Slow (Kahneman, 2011).
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allows for other equilibria associated with outcomes that are not aligned with the social
goal at hand. An important appeal of partial implementation involves the revelation
principle, which implies, in the rational domain and under incomplete information, the
following: if there exists a particular mechanism that partially implements a predeter-
mined goal, then there exists a direct revelation mechanism that truthfully implements
it.3 The undesired equilibria are then often disregarded on the basis of the equilibrium
with truthful revelation being the salient equilibrium. This is pointed out in Postlewaite
and Schmeidler (1986) as follows:
[The partial (direct revelation) implementation] does assure that the re-
sulting outcome will be an equilibrium of some game; however, there may
be others as well. This problem is sometimes dismissed with an argument
that as long as truthful revelation is an equilibrium, it will somehow be the
salient equilibrium even if there are other equilibria as well.
We show that the revelation principle (for partial implementation) fails when indi-
viduals’ choices do not satisfy the WARP. Hence, in our environment, one cannot restrict
attention to direct revelation mechanisms without a loss of generality. Thus, focusing on
full implementation rather than partial implementation becomes crucial in our setup.
The concept of EPE is well-suited to our environment for the following reasons: it
makes no use of any probabilistic information, it is belief-free, i.e., it does not involve
any belief updating or any expectation considerations and it does not require any com-
mon prior assumption. It is convenient for handling interdependence and is robust to
informational assumptions regarding the environment. Furthermore, the EPE has an ex
post no-regret property: “as no agent would like to change his message even if he were
to know the true type profile of the remaining agents” (Bergemann & Morris, 2008).
On the other hand, the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium is not suited to our
setup. This is because the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium employs an aggregation
of individuals’ welfare in different states of the world using the associated probabilities.
At the very least, this necessitates the need for complete and transitive preferences over
the set of certain outcomes in order to obtain a utility representation. However, this
is neither coherent nor consistent in a setting in which individuals’ choices over certain
outcomes (alternatively, degenerate acts) do not necessarily obey the standard axioms
of rationality. Indeed, in our environment, individuals’ choices over certain outcomes
may not even be representable by well-defined preference relations (see Footnote 15).
3A direct revelation mechanism is a game-form in which each individual’s actions consist of a report
about his/her own privately observed type.
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We provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for ex-post implementation when
individuals’ choices need not be rational.
In order to highlight the new grounds our results cover relative to the complete infor-
mation analysis, we point out that behavioral (full) ex-post implementation is not the
same as behavioral (Nash) implementation on every complete information type space.4
This follows from the associated necessary conditions being not nested even in the ra-
tional domain (Bergemann & Morris, 2008, Propositions 3 and 4), and our necessary
conditions implying those under WARP.
Our results on necessity, Theorems 1 and 2, show that if a mechanism ex-post imple-
ments a social choice set (SCS, hereafter), then the opportunity sets sustained in ex-post
equilibria of this mechanism form a collection of sets with two desirable properties.5,6
The first of these implies a pseudo ex-post incentive compatibility (Proposition 2), while
the second implies an ex-post choice monotonicity condition (Proposition 1). We also
illustrate how the mechanism designer may employ behavioral biases when constructing
these opportunity sets in order to implement the desired social goal.
Another implication of our results on necessity is that the revelation principle holds
whenever individuals’ choices satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives (hence-
forth IIA; see Footnote 11).
A further contribution of our necessity results concerns the simplicity of the mecha-
nisms needed for implementation. Naturally, simplicity becomes a bigger concern when
dealing with individuals having cognitive limitations. We consider the number of mes-
sages of a mechanism as a measure of its simplicity. In Theorem 3, we identify lower
bounds with respect to this measure for mechanisms that ex-post implement a given SCS.
4Bergemann and Morris (2005) shows that (partial) ex-post implementation is equivalent to in-
terim (or Bayesian) implementation for all possible type spaces in some environments. Even in these
environments, this equivalence does not hold in the case of full implementation.
5The opportunity set of an individual consists of the alternatives that he/she can obtain by changing
his/her messages, while those of the opponents remain the same.
6We refer to such family of sets as the collection of sets consistent with the given SCS under incomplete
information. Each member of this collection of sets is associated with an individual and a social choice
function (SCF) in the SCS and a type profile of the other individuals with the property that each
such set is independent of the message (in the mechanism) chosen by the individual whom this set
is associated with. Moreover the following hold: (1) Given any individual and any one of his/her
particular types and any SCF in the SCS and any type profile for the other individuals, it must be that
the individual’s choices under the resulting type profile contain the alternative that corresponds to the
outcome of the SCF for the same type profile; and (2) whenever there is a deception that leads to an
outcome that is not compatible with the SCS, there exist an informant state (i.e., a type profile) and an
informant individual such that he/she does not choose at the informant state the alternative generated
by this deception from his/her set associated with others’ types identified via their deception from the
informant state.
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This, therefore, provides a better understanding of the scope of a well-known criticism of
the mechanism design literature, which involves the argument that, often, mechanisms
employed are complicated and thus do not offer much practical appeal.
We provide sufficiency results for the case of two individuals and for the case of three
or more individuals, separately.
The first of our sufficiency results, Theorem 4, with two individuals is motivated
by our observations concerning necessity and employs a novel and intuitive mechanism
that dispenses with the integer/modulo game. The second and third, Theorems 5 and
6, provide two other routes to strengthen our necessary conditions to deliver sufficiency,
by requiring either some sort of choice incompatibility or some sort of choice unanimity.
With three or more individuals, we present two methods to turn our necessary con-
ditions into sufficient conditions: The first, Theorem 7, involves a mild condition that
requires some level of disagreement among the individuals. Theorem 8 presents the sec-
ond method in which we employ a combination of our necessary conditions and a choice
counterpart of the no-veto-power property.
Our paper is mostly related to de Clippel (2014), which provides an analysis of
behavioral implementation for the case of complete information. Besides de Clippel
(2014), another closely related paper is Bergemann and Morris (2008), which analyzes
ex-post implementation in the rational domain.7 In a sense, our paper can be thought
of as an envelope of de Clippel (2014) and Bergemann and Morris (2008). We extend
de Clippel (2014)’s analysis to the case of incomplete information and Bergemann and
Morris (2008)’s analysis to the case where individual choices’ need not satisfy the WARP.
A due remark is that we provide a novel analysis for the case of two individuals.8
Another related paper is Jackson (1991), which analyzes Bayesian implementation for
the case of three or more individuals in the rational domain. Jackson (1991) generalizes
the analysis of Maskin (1999) (on Nash implementation under complete information) to
the case of incomplete information. In this sense, what Jackson (1991) is to the seminal
work in Maskin (1999), our paper is to de Clippel (2014).9
7Some of the other influential and related work on ex-post implementation and robust mechanism
design in the rational domain include Bergemann and Morris (2005), Jehiel, Meyer-ter Vehn, Moldovanu,
and Zame (2006), Jehiel, Meyer-ter Vehn, and Moldovanu (2008), Bergemann and Morris (2009), and
Bergemann and Morris (2011).
8In the rational domain, Ohashi (2012) provides sufficiency results for ex-post implementation with
two individuals in an environment that is economic and has a bad outcome. Our sufficiency results
for the case of two individuals differ with those of Ohashi (2012) in three dimensions: (i) we allow for
non-economic environments, (ii) we do not require the existence of a bad outcome, and (iii) we allow
individuals’ choices to violate the WARP.
9Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) also provide analyses of full
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Hurwicz (1986), Korpela (2012), and Ray (2018) have also investigated the problem
of implementation under complete information when individual choices do not have to
satisfy the standard axioms of rationality. Hurwicz (1986) considers choices that can
be represented by a well-defined preference relation which does not have to be acyclic.
On the other hand, Korpela (2012) shows that when individual choices fail rationality
axioms, IIA, also known as Sen’s α, is key to obtaining the necessary and sufficient
condition synonymous to that of Moore and Repullo (1990) (the so-called Condition µ)
under complete information.
There have been other attempts at investigating the problem of implementation un-
der complete information that allow for “non-rational” behavior of individuals. Eliaz
(2002) provides an analysis of implementation when some of the individuals might be
“faulty” and hence fail to act optimally. An earlier paper of ours, Barlo and Dalkiran
(2009), provides an analysis of implementation for the case of epsilon-Nash equilibrium,
i.e., when individuals are satisfied by getting close to (but not necessarily achieving)
their best responses. Glazer and Rubinstein (2012) provides a mechanism design ap-
proach where the content and the framing of the mechanism affect individuals’ ability
to manipulate their information.10
Section 2 presents a motivating example illustrating the difficulties associated with
the desired construction. In Section 3, we provide the notation and the definitions.
Section 4 contains our necessity results. In Section 5, we discuss simple mechanisms.
Section 6 contains our sufficiency results and Section 7 concludes. Meanwhile, the proofs
are presented in the Appendix.
2 Motivating Example
The following example aims to display the intricacies concerning the design of a
mechanism which implements a behavioral welfare notion [strict generalized Pareto op-
timality due to Bernheim and Rangel (2009)] in EPE with two individuals whose choices
do not satisfy the WARP.11 These choices involve three types of behavioral biases: (1)
implementation under incomplete information allowing for different informational assumptions. Indeed,
there is a large literature on implementation, and it would not be possible to mention many interesting
work here. Instead, we refer the interested reader to surveys such as Moore (1992), Jackson (2001),
Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002), Palfrey (2002) Serrano (2004).
10Some of the other related work include Cabrales and Serrano (2011), Saran (2011), Kucuksenel
(2012), Saran (2016), and Bochet and Tumennasan (2018).
11Sen (1971) shows that a choice correspondence satisfies the WARP (and be represented by a com-
plete and transitive preference relation) if and only if it satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives
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attraction effect, (2) status-quo bias, and (3) Condorcet cycles. Indeed, our exam-
ple demonstrates that behavioral implementation under incomplete information can be
achieved with different behavioral biases in different states of the world.
We refer to the two individuals as Ann and Bob, who are to decide what type of
energy to employ or jointly invest in, be it coal energy, nuclear energy, or solar energy.
Thus, the grand set of alternatives is X = {coal, nuclear, solar}.12,13
Let the set of all relevant states of the world regarding the individuals’ choices be
given by Θ. We assume that the true state of the world is not commonly known between
Ann and Bob. Instead, the true state of the world is distributed knowledge between the
individuals. That is, Θ has a product structure, i.e., Θ = ΘA × ΘB. When the true
state of the world is θ = (θA, θB), Ann is informed only of θA (her type), whereas Bob
is informed only of θB (his type). Suppose that Ann and Bob have two possible types
each, denoted by Θi = {ρi, γi} for i ∈ {A,B}. So the set of all possible states of the
world is given by Θ = {(ρA, ρB), (ρA, γB), (γA, ρB), (γA, γB)}.
The individual choices of Ann and Bob at state θ ∈ Θ are described by the choice
correspondences, CθA : X → X , and CθB : X → X , where X denotes the set of non-empty
subsets of X and Cθi (S) ⊆ S for each S ∈ X and i ∈ {A,B}. Table 1 pinpoints the
specific choices to be used in our example with the convention that c stands for coal, n
for nuclear power, and s for solar energy.
S C
(ρA,ρB)
A C
(ρA,ρB)
B C
(ρA,γB)
A C
(ρA,γB)
B C
(γA,ρB)
A C
(γA,ρB)
B C
(γA,γB)
A C
(γA,γB)
B
{c, n, s} {n} {s} {n} {n} {n} {c} {c, s} {n, s}
{c, n} {n} {n} {n} {n} {n} {c} {n} {c}
{c, s} {c, s} {s} {s} {s} {c} {c} {c} {s}
{n, s} {n} {s} {s} {s} {n, s} {n, s} {s} {s}
Table 1: Individual choices of Ann and Bob.
Let us elaborate on the individual choices of Ann and Bob at each state:
At state (ρA, ρB), Ann’s choices can be rationalized by the preference relation n A
c ∼A s, and Bob’s choices can be rationalized by the preference relation s B n B c.
(referred to as IIA or Sen’s α) and an expansion consistency axiom (known as Sen’s β). Formally, we say
that the individual choice correspondence C : X → X satisfies Sen’s α if whenever x ∈ S ⊂ T for some
S, T ∈ X , x ∈ C(T ) implies x ∈ C(S). Meanwhile, we say that the individual choice correspondence
C : X → X satisfies Sen’s β if x, y ∈ S ⊂ T for some S, T ∈ X , and x, y ∈ C(S) implies x ∈ C(T ) if
and only if y ∈ C(T ).
12Ann and Bob can also be interpreted as region A and region B within the same legislation, such as
two states in the U.S. or two countries in the E.U.
13In his Nobel Prize Lecture “Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals” (December 8,
2007), Eric Maskin provides an example in which an energy authority “is charged with choosing the
type of energy to be used by Alice and Bob” in the rational domain under complete information.
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The identical choices of Ann and Bob at (ρA, γB) can be explained by the attraction
effect, one of the commonly observed behavioral biases:14 Decoy alternatives, alternatives
that are known to be dominated by other alternatives, can cause preference reversals
when they are introduced into the choice set. Herne (1997) demonstrates how the
presence of a decoy alternative causes the attraction effect in a policy-making context:
In September 1993, Finland took the decision to build a new nuclear power plant to
a parliamentary vote. The majority of the opponents of nuclear power favored the
alternative of decentralized solar power plants. Even though it was not on the table
at all, the supporters of the nuclear power plant used coal power plants as a point of
comparison to nuclear power plants. Nuclear power dominated coal as it was more
environment friendly and more reliable, at the time, in terms of stability and price. On
the other hand, solar power was better for the environment when compared to both
nuclear power and coal. However, the high costs of solar panels and intermittency
made it less appealing than nuclear power and coal in terms of reliability. That is,
nuclear dominated coal in both environment and reliability dimensions, but solar power
dominated coal only in the dimension of environment. In this case, the supporters of
nuclear power deliberately used coal as a decoy alternative in the sense that it was
not intended to be implemented but was presented in the consideration set in order to
increase the attractiveness of nuclear power.
At (ρA, γB), as in the Finland power plant example, Ann and Bob choose nuclear
from the grand set {coal, nuclear, solar} and solar from the set {nuclear, solar}. They
also choose nuclear from the set {coal, nuclear}. This means Ann and Bob individually
choose nuclear whenever it is presented with coal, the decoy option. Yet, whenever coal
is not available they choose solar over nuclear. These also show that at state (ρA, γB),
their individual choices cannot be rationalized by a complete and transitive preference
relation, as they violate the IIA.15
14A seminal paper for the attraction effect is Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982). See also de Clippel
and Eliaz (2012) and Ok, Ortoleva, and Riella (2015).
15In fact, there is no well-defined preference relation representing these choices. We wish to define
what we mean by a choice correspondence being represented by a well-defined preference relation. To
that regard, for any given individual choice correspondence C : X → X , letC be the induced preference
relation and be defined by: x C y if and only if there exists S ∈ X with x, y ∈ S and x ∈ C(S). On the
other hand, given a preference relation  on X, the induced normal choice correspondence C : X → X
is defined by C(S) = {x ∈ S : x  y for all y ∈ S} for S ∈ X . We say that the individual choice
correspondence C : X → X is represented by a well-defined preference relation C if C equals CC .
Further, Theorem 9 of Sen (1971) in the current setting says that a choice correspondence can be
represented with a well-defined preference relation (which is not necessarily transitive) if and only if
the choice correspondence satisfies Sen’s α and γ. While Sen’s α is defined in Footnote 11, a choice
correspondence C : X → X satisfies Sen’s γ if x ∈ C(S)∩C(T ) for some S, T ∈ X implies x ∈ C(S∪T ).
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We would like to emphasize that we allow individual choices to be interdependent :
between (ρA, ρB) and (ρA, γB), Ann’s private information (type) does not change; yet,
the choice behavior of Ann is not identical at these two states. That is, even though
Ann does not know Bob’s private information (type), she knows the set of all possible
types of Bob. Therefore, Ann might consider what she were to choose contingent upon
each possible type of Bob. This is especially relevant when the information in the hands
of Bob is relevant for Ann’s choices as in the case of a common value auction.
On the other hand, at state (γA, ρB), Bob’s choices can be rationalized by the pref-
erence relation c B s ∼B n, whereas Ann’s choices feature a status-quo bias where the
status-quo is coal.16 It is well-documented that when individuals face new alternatives to
replace a status-quo they have a tendency to keep the status-quo unless it is fully domi-
nated by one of the alternatives in all relevant attributes. Suppose the status-quo source
of energy in Ann’s country is coal and Ann is considering whether to switch to another
type of energy, be it nuclear or solar. Since nuclear dominates coal in the dimensions
of environment and reliability —representing all relevant attributes— one might expect
Ann to choose nuclear from the grand set {coal, nuclear, solar}, whereas coal might be
chosen from the set {coal, solar} since solar does not dominate coal in the reliability
dimension. Such a choice, by itself, does not violate the WARP. Yet there might not
be a clear winner between nuclear and solar when staying with the status-quo is not
an option, i.e., Ann’s choice from the set {nuclear, solar} might be both nuclear and
solar. Then, the WARP (in particular, Sen’s β) would not hold (see Footnote 11). As
a result, Ann’s choices at (γA, ρB) cannot be rationalized by a complete and transitive
preference relation as they violate Sen’s β.17
Finally, at state (γA, γB), neither of the individual choices can be rationalized by a
complete and transitive preference relation because the individual choices of Ann and
Bob violate the IIA and Sen’s β.18 Furthermore, Ann’s choices lead to a Condorcet cycle:
Ann chooses nuclear from the set {coal, nuclear}, coal from the set {coal, solar}, and
solar from the set {nuclear, solar}.19 Such a pattern may arise when Ann makes her
It can easily be verified that at state (ρA, γB) the individuals’ choices satisfy neither Sen’s α nor γ.
16A seminal paper for status-quo bias is Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), see also Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler (1991), Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), and Dean, Kıbrıs, and Masatlioglu (2017).
17Even though Sen’s β fails, Ann’s individual choices at (γA, ρB) can be represented by a well-defined
(but intransitive) preference relation as both Sen’s α and γ hold.
18At this state, neither of the individual’s choices can be represented by a well-defined preference
relation as the IIA is violated for both of the individuals.
19Hurwicz (1986) investigates the problem of implementation when individuals represent groups of
rational agents. On the other hand, cyclic or intransitive preferences may also arise when individuals
are regular human beings (Tversky, 1969).
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choices by consulting a group of individuals, such as pairwise voting with her parents,
or a parliamentary vote.
Next comes the social choice notion, the welfare criterion developed by Bernheim
and Rangel (2009).20 This welfare criterion provides a choice theoretic foundation for
behavioral welfare economics as it is directly based on individual choices.
Following Bernheim and Rangel (2009), we say that an alternative x is strictly unam-
biguously chosen over another alternative z, if z is never chosen whenever x is available.
On the other hand, an alternative x is weakly unambiguously chosen over another al-
ternative z, if whenever they are both available, z is never chosen unless x is chosen as
well. These extend the notion of Pareto efficiency beyond the rational domain:
An alternative x is a strict generalized Pareto optimum if there does not exist any
other alternative y, such that y is weakly unambiguously chosen over x for every indi-
vidual, and y is strictly unambiguously chosen over x for some individual(s). We refer
to a strict generalized Pareto optimum alternative as a BR-optimal outcome.
The social planner who faces the individual choices of Ann and Bob does not know
the true state of the world but cares about their welfare according to the welfare notion
of Bernheim and Rangel (2009). Thus, the planner aims to provide Ann and Bob a state
contingent allocation which is BR-optimal at every state.21
State (ρA, ρB) (ρA, γB) (γA, ρB) (γA, γB)
BR-optimal alternatives {n, s} {n, s} {c, n} {c, s}
Table 2: BR-optimal alternatives.
The BR-optimal alternatives contingent on the states are as summarized in Table
2.22 As in Palfrey and Srivastava (1987), a social choice set (SCS) refers to a selection
20Another paper that provides a welfare analysis that is in line with non-rational choices is Rubinstein
and Salant (2011).
21BR-optimal alternatives are defined under certainty. It is not clear how to extend this notion of
efficiency to the case of uncertainty as the individual choices of Ann and Bob violate the standard
rationality axioms and hence the expected utility hypothesis. So, the goal of the social planner can be
thought of as obtaining an ex-post strict generalized Pareto optimal state contingent allocation.
22When individual choices can be rationalized with a complete and transitive preference relation, the
BR-optimal outcomes are the same as the standard Pareto optimal outcomes. Therefore, at (ρA, ρB),
the BR-optimal outcomes are nuclear and solar. On the other hand, at (ρA, γB), since coal is never
chosen (except when it is offered as a singleton), it is easy to see that the BR-optimal outcomes are
nuclear and solar At (γA, ρB), coal is strictly unambiguously chosen over solar by both Ann and Bob.
Hence, solar is not BR-optimal at (γA, ρB). Even though coal is also strictly unambiguously chosen over
nuclear by Bob at (γA, ρB), coal is not weakly unambiguously chosen over nuclear by Ann, since Ann
chooses nuclear from the set {coal, nuclear} at (γA, ρB). Thus, the BR-optimal outcomes at (γA, ρB)
are coal and nuclear. Finally, at (γA, γB), solar is strictly unambiguously chosen over nuclear by Ann
and it is weakly unambiguously chosen over nuclear by Bob. So, nuclear is not BR-optimal at (γA, γB).
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of state contingent allocations. In what follows, the planner aims to implement the
following SCS: F = {f, f ′}, described in Table 3.
State (ρA, ρB) (ρA, γB) (γA, ρB) (γA, γB)
f n n n s
f ′ s s c c
Table 3: The social choice set F for Ann and Bob.
F is mutually exhaustive of BR-optimal outcomes as {f(θ)} ∪ {f ′(θ)} equals the set
of BR-optimal outcomes at every θ ∈ Θ.23
2.1 The mechanism
A mechanism makes Ann and Bob send individual messages to the social planner
and describes the outcome to be implemented as a function of these messages. We
consider the following mechanism: messages available to Ann and Bob are given by
MA = {U,M,D} and MB = {L,M,R}, respectively; the outcome function that maps
messages to alternatives is represented by g : M → X and is described in Table 4. This
Bob
Ann
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
Table 4: The mechanism µ for Ann and Bob.
mechanism is denoted by µ = (M, g), with M = MA ×MB and g : M → X.
In what follows, we show that µ ex-post implements the aforementioned goal of the
planner. We start this task by identifying the Nash equilibrium (NE) outcomes of µ.
de Clippel (2014) points out an intuitive and straightforward extension of the notion
of NE involving individuals’ choices that cannot be rationalized by a complete and tran-
sitive preference relation: For each individual, the equilibrium outcome should be among
the chosen within the set of alternatives he/she can generate by unilateral deviations.
This intuition is aligned with the opportunity criterion of Sugden (2004) in that the
Both coal and solar are BR-optimal at (γA, γB), since from the set {coal, solar} Ann chooses coal and
Bob solar at (γA, γB).
23We note that there is no particular reason other than simplicity for choosing the mutually exhaustive
selection {f, f ′} as the SCS F . In general, the design of a mechanism would depend on the particular
SCS under consideration.
10
set of alternatives an individual is free to choose from, i.e., the opportunity set of an
individual, is determined in a mechanism by the messages of the other individuals.
We follow de Clippel (2014) and denote the opportunity sets of Ann and Bob in our
mechanism by OµA(mB) := {g(mA,mB)|mA ∈ MA} and OµB(mA) := {g(mA,mB)|mB ∈
MB}, respectively. We say that m∗ = (m∗A,m∗B) is a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism
µ = (M, g) at θ if g(m∗) ∈ CθA(OµA(m∗B)) and g(m∗) ∈ CθB(OµB(m∗A)). Whenever m∗ is an
NE of µ at θ, we refer to g(m∗) as a Nash equilibrium outcome of µ at θ.
Let us exemplify by identifying the NE of our mechanism at state (γA, γB). Please
refer to Table 1 for the individuals’ choices at (γA, γB).
If Ann sends the message U , Bob can unilaterally generate the set {c, n} under the
mechanism µ, i.e., OµB(U) = {c, n}. Bob chooses c from the set {c, n} at (γA, γB), which
implies that Bob finds it optimal to send the message M . The best response action M
chosen by Bob against Ann’s message U is depicted in Table 5 by a superscript B in
cell (U,M). Similarly, when Ann sends the message M , Bob can unilaterally generate
the set {c, s} under the mechanism µ, i.e., OµB(M) = {c, s}, and Bob chooses s from the
set {c, s} at (γA, γB). Thus, Bob finds it optimal to send the message M against Ann’s
action M . Finally, if Ann sends the message D, Bob can unilaterally generate the set
{n, s} under the mechanism µ, i.e., OµB(D) = {n, s}. Bob chooses s from the set {n, s}
at (γA, γB); hence, both M and R are the best responses for Bob.
L M R
U An A c B n
M c sB Ac
D An sB A s B
Table 5: The best responses and Nash equilibria of the mechanism at (γA, γB).
On the other hand, when Bob sends the message L, Ann can unilaterally generate
the set {c, n} under the mechanism µ, i.e., OµA(L) = {c, n}. Ann chooses n from the set
{c, n} at (γA, γB). Therefore, her best responses to Bob sending message L consist of
U and D, which are indicated in Table 5 by a superscript A in cells (U,L) and (D,L).
If Bob sends the message M , Ann can unilaterally generate the set {c, s} under the
mechanism µ, i.e., OµA(M) = {c, s}. Ann chooses c from the set {c, s} at (γA, γB).
Finally, when Bob sends the message R, Ann can unilaterally generate the set {c, n, s}
under the mechanism µ, i.e., OµA(R) = {c, n, s}. Ann chooses both c and s from the set
{c, n, s} at (γA, γB).
The resulting best responses are summarized in Table 5, which shows that the NE of
the mechanism µ at state (γA, γB) are the message profiles (U,M) and (D,R). Hence,
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the corresponding NE outcomes at (γA, γB) are c and s.
Repeating this exercise, one can show that the NE and NE outcomes of our mecha-
nism at other states of the world are as presented in Table 6 (where NE message profiles
are depicted using circles in the corresponding cells).
State: (ρA, ρB) State: (ρA, γB) State: (γA, ρB) State: (γA, γB)
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
NE outcomes: {n, s} NE outcomes: {n, s} NE outcomes: {c, n} NE outcomes: {c, s}
Table 6: Nash equilibria and Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism.
Going over Tables 2 and 6 reveals that the set of BR-optimal outcomes and the set
of NE outcomes of our mechanism coincide at every state of the world. Therefore, if the
true state of the world were common knowledge between Ann and Bob, our mechanism
would be (fully) implementing the BR-optimal outcomes in NE.24
2.2 Ex-post equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism
The state of the world is distributed knowledge between Ann and Bob, and they
observe only their own types before sending their messages. Thus, their plans of actions
(strategies) can depend only on their own types and not the whole state of the world.
That is, under the resulting incomplete information, the strategies of Ann and Bob in
the mechanism µ should be measurable with respect to their private information: a
strategy for Ann and Bob in µ is a function σi : Θi →Mi for i ∈ {A,B}.
There is not a clear way of defining a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the mechanism
µ in our example as Ann and Bob cannot be modeled as (expected) utility maximizers.
Similarly, as there is no clear way to evaluate an individual’s well-being with mixed
strategies in our setup, we restrict our attention to pure strategies of the mechanism µ.
Fortunately, a pure strategy EPE of our mechanism is belief-free and does not re-
quire any expectation considerations. We say that the strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗A, σ
∗
B)
24We would like to emphasize that µ Nash implements the BR-optimal outcomes under complete
information and ex-post implements F under incomplete information. In general, a mechanism that
ex-post implements an SCS F does not have to Nash implement the social choice correspondence
associated with F . For example, the mechanism presented in Table 11 ex-post implements the SCS F
of our motivating example under incomplete information but does not Nash implement the BR-optimal
outcomes (the social choice correspondence associated with F ) under complete information.
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is an ex-post equilibrium of the mechanism µ = (M, g) if for all θ ∈ Θ, g(σ∗(θ)) ∈
CθA(O
µ
A(σ
∗
B(θB))) and g(σ
∗(θ)) ∈ CθB(OµB(σ∗A(θA))). In words, an EPE requires that the
strategies of Ann and Bob induce an NE of the mechanism µ at every state of the world
and that they are measurable with respect to their private information.
The following shows that there are three EPE of our mechanism, two of which are
equivalent in terms of the outcomes they generate:
Claim 1. The strategy profiles σ′∗ = (σ′∗A , σ
′∗
B), σ
′′∗ = (σ′′∗A , σ
′′∗
B ), and σ
′′′∗ = (σ′′′∗A , σ
′′′∗
B )
described below are the only EPE of the mechanism µ = (M, g), where the outcomes
generated under σ′′∗ and σ′′′∗ are equivalent, i.e., g(σ′′∗(θ)) = g(σ′′′∗(θ)) for each θ ∈ Θ.
σ′∗ : σ′∗A(ρA) = U σ
′∗
A(γA) = D and σ
′∗
B(ρB) = L σ
′∗
B(γB) = R,
σ′′∗ : σ′′∗A (ρA) = D σ
′′∗
A (γA) = U and σ
′′∗
B (ρB) = M σ
′′∗
B (γB) = M,
σ′′′∗ : σ′′′∗A (ρA) = M σ
′′′∗
A (γA) = U and σ
′′′∗
B (ρB) = M σ
′′′∗
B (γB) = M.
Table 7 summarizes the EPE outcomes of µ where message profiles corresponding to
σ′∗ are depicted with circles while those associated with σ′′∗ are indicated with squares
and those corresponding to σ′′′∗ with diamonds in the corresponding cells.
State: (ρA, ρB) State: (ρA, γB) State: (γA, ρB) State: (γA, γB)
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
L M R
U n c n
M c s c
D n s s
EPE outcomes: {n, s} EPE outcomes: {n, s} EPE outcomes: {c, n} EPE outcomes: {c, s}
Table 7: Ex-post equilibria and ex-post equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism.
Tables 2 and 7 show that the set of BR-optimal outcomes and the set of EPE out-
comes of µ coincide. Referring to Table 3 which describes the SCS F , we also observe
that g(σ′∗(θ)) = f(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ, and g(σ′′∗(θ)) = g(σ′′′∗(θ)) = f ′(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ.
That is, (1) each social choice function (henceforth, SCF) in the SCS induces the same
outcomes under a particular EPE of the mechanism µ; and (2) for each EPE of the
mechanism µ, there is a particular SCF in the SCS that induces the same outcomes
state by state. Thus, µ (fully) ex-post implements the SCS F . In Section 5.1, we show
that the mechanism µ is the “simplest mechanism” ex-post implementing the SCS F .
2.3 The revelation principle fails
The revelation principle (for partial implementation) fails in our example: Consider
the SCF f given in Table 3. Because σ′∗ is an EPE of µ with g(σ′∗(θ)) = f(θ) for
13
all θ ∈ Θ, the mechanism µ partially ex-post implements the SCF f . However, the
corresponding direct revelation mechanism, gd : Θ → X, given in Table 8, fails to
partially ex-post implement f truthfully as truthful revelation is not an EPE of gd:
When the state is (ρA, γB), reporting truthfully delivers n (circled in Table 8).
25 But, the
Bob
Ann
ρB γB
ρA n n
γA n s
Table 8: The direct revelation mechanism gd.
opportunity set of Ann at state (ρA, γB) is given by {n, s} and n /∈ C(ρA,γB)A ({n, s}) = {s}.
Therefore, even though there exists a mechanism that partially (ex-post) implements the
particular SCF, f , the direct revelation mechanism fails to partially (ex-post) implement
f under truthful revelation.
3 Notation and Definitions
Consider a set of individuals, denoted by N = {1, . . . , n}, who have to select an
alternative from a non-empty set of alternatives X. Let Θ denote the set of all relevant
states of the world regarding the choices of the individuals from (the subsets of) the set of
alternatives X. We assume that there is incomplete information among the individuals
regarding the true state of the world, and that the true state of the world is distributed
knowledge. That is, Θ has a product structure, i.e., Θ = ×i∈NΘi where θi ∈ Θi denotes
the private information (type) of individual i ∈ N at state θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ Θ. We also
assume that the choice behavior of individual i at state θ is described by the individual
choice correspondence Cθi : X → X , such that the feasibility requirement of Cθi (S) ⊆ S
for all S ∈ X holds where X denotes the set of all non-empty subsets of X. Therefore, the
environment we are interested in can be summarized by the tuple 〈N,X,Θ, (Cθi )i∈N,θ∈Θ〉.
We assume that the environment, 〈N,X,Θ, (Cθi )i∈N,θ∈Θ〉, is common knowledge among
the individuals, and that it is known to the designer. We also note that our setup allows
(but does not depend on) individual choices to be interdependent. That is, individuals
are allowed to choose differently when their own type is fixed but others’ are different.
An SCF is a function f : Θ → X that specifies a socially optimal alternative—as
25A direct revelation mechanism is one where the message sets equal the type spaces of individuals.
This is why it is enough to specify only an outcome function gd : Θ→ X to describe a direct revelation
mechanism.
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evaluated by the planner—for each possible state of the world. In other words, f can be
viewed as a state contingent allocation. As there may be many socially optimal state
contingent allocations that a designer wishes to consider simultaneously, we focus on
social choice sets (SCS) rather than SCFs. An SCS, denoted by F , is a non-empty set
of SCFs, i.e., F ⊂ {f |f : Θ→ X} and F 6= ∅.26 F denotes the set of all SCSs.
We denote a mechanism by µ = (M, g) where Mi denotes the non-empty set of
messages available to individual i with M = ×i∈NMi, and g : M → X describes the
outcome function that specifies the alternative to be selected for each message profile.
The opportunity set of an individual under a mechanism is the set of alternatives that
he/she can generate by unilateral deviations given the messages of the other individuals:
The opportunity set of individual i under µ = (M, g) for each m−i ∈ M−i is given by
Oµi (m−i) = {g(mi,m−i) ∈ X : mi ∈ Mi}. Consequently, an NE of a mechanism at
a particular state of the world is defined as follows: A message profile m∗ is a Nash
equilibrium of µ = (M, g) at θ if g(m∗) ∈ Cθi (Oµi (m∗−i)) for all i ∈ N .
The mechanism µ in our environment induces an incomplete information game-form.
A strategy of individual i under the mechanism µ = (M, g), a contingent plan of actions,
specifies a message for each possible type of i, and is denoted by σi : Θi → Mi. Due to
aforementioned reasons, we restrict attention to pure EPE.
Definition 1. A strategy profile σ∗ : Θ→M is an ex-post equilibrium of µ = (M, g)
if for each θ ∈ Θ, we have g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (Oµi (σ∗−i(θ−i))) for all i ∈ N .
In words, an EPE requires that the outcomes generated by the mechanism be NE at
every state of the world, while individuals’ strategies have to be measurable with respect
to only their own types. This delivers the notion of ex-post implementability:
Definition 2. We say that an SCS F ∈ F is ex-post implementable if there exists
a mechanism µ = (M, g) such that:
(i) For every f ∈ F , there exists an EPE σ∗ of µ = (M, g) that satisfies f = g ◦ σ∗,
i.e., f(θ) = g(σ∗(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ; and
(ii) For every EPE σ∗ of µ = (M, g), there exists f ∈ F such that g ◦ σ∗ = f , i.e.,
g(σ∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
26We note that it is customary to denote a social choice rule as an SCS rather than a social choice
correspondence under incomplete information. To that regard, we refer to Postlewaite and Schmeidler
(1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1987), Jackson (1991) and Bergemann and Morris (2008).
15
Given an SCS, ex-post implementability demands the existence of a mechanism such
that (i) every SCF in the SCS must be sustained by an EPE strategy profile, and (ii)
every EPE strategy profile of the mechanism must correspond to an SCF in the SCS.
Hence, this is full ex-post implementation. We refer to an SCF f as being partially
ex-post implementable whenever condition (i) in Definition 2 holds for F = {f}.
Any mechanism that ex-post implements an SCS should take into consideration the
private information of the individuals. However, individuals may misreport their private
information. We denote a deception by individual i as αi : Θi → Θi. The interpretation is
that αi(θi) is individual i’s reported type. Therefore, α(θ) := (α1(θ1), α2(θ2), . . . , αn(θn))
is a profile of reported types, which might be deceptive. We move forward with the
necessary conditions for ex-post implementation.
4 Necessity
We show that the following notion of consistency under incomplete information is
necessary for ex-post implementation. When the meaning is clear, we refer to this notion
simply as consistency.
Definition 3. We say that a non-empty collection of sets S := {Si(f, θ−i)|i ∈ N, f ∈
F, θ−i ∈ Θ−i} ⊂ X is consistent with the SCS F ∈ F under incomplete infor-
mation if for every SCF f ∈ F , we have
(i) for all i ∈ N , f(θ′i, θ−i) ∈ C(θ
′
i,θ−i)
i (Si(f, θ−i)) for each θ
′
i ∈ Θi, and
(ii) for any deception profile α with f ◦ α /∈ F , there exists θ∗ ∈ Θ and i∗ ∈ N such
that f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ∗−i∗))).
A collection of sets S satisfying consistency with an SCS F under incomplete infor-
mation obeys the property that Si(f, θ−i) does not depend on θi, for all i ∈ N and f ∈ F
and θ−i ∈ Θ−i, and the following hold: (1) Given any i ∈ N and any f ∈ F and any
θ−i ∈ Θ−i, it must be that i’s choices when he/she is of type θ′i at state (θ′i, θ−i) contains
f(θ′i, θ−i) for all θ
′
i ∈ Θi; and (2) given any f ∈ F , whenever there is a deception profile
α that leads to an outcome not compatible with the SCS, i.e., f ◦α /∈ F , there exists an
informant state θ∗ and an informant individual i∗ such that i∗ does not choose at state
θ∗ the alternative f(α(θ∗)) (generated by this deception) from Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ∗−i∗)).
Our first result establishes that consistency with an SCS under incomplete informa-
tion is a necessary condition for that SCS to be ex-post implementable.
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Theorem 1. If an SCS F ∈ F is ex-post implementable, then there exists a non-empty
collection of sets S := {Si(f, θ−i)|i ∈ N, f ∈ F, θ−i ∈ Θ−i} consistent with F under
incomplete information.
If a mechanism µ ex-post implements an SCS F , then Theorem 1 establishes that
the opportunity sets obtained from the mechanism form a non-empty collection of sets
consistent with F .
Next, we improve the necessary conditions for the case of two individuals: Theorem
2 establishes that the following notion of two-individual consistency under incomplete
information is necessary for ex-post implementation.
Definition 4. We say that collections of sets S1 := {S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈ Θ2} ⊂ X and
S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈ F, θ1 ∈ Θ1} ⊂ X are two-individual consistent with the SCS
F ∈ F under incomplete information if
(i) for all f ∈ F , f(θ′1, θ2) ∈ C(θ
′
1,θ2)
1 (S1(f, θ2)) for each θ
′
1 ∈ Θ1,
(ii) for all f ∈ F , f(θ1, θ′2) ∈ C(θ1,θ
′
2)
2 (S2(f, θ1)) for each θ
′
2 ∈ Θ2,
(iii) for all f, f ′ ∈ F , S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ1) 6= ∅ for each θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2,
(iv) for all f ∈ F , if f ◦ α /∈ F , then there exists θ∗ = (θ∗1, θ∗2) ∈ Θ such that
either f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f, α2(θ∗2))) or f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f, α1(θ∗1))).
We note that (i) and (ii) of two-individual consistency is implied by (i) of consistency
while (ii) of consistency implies (iv) of two-individual consistency. That is why the novel
condition of two-individual consistency is (iii): For any given pairs of SCFs in the SCS,
the two collections of sets must be such that each set associated with individual 1 has a
common alternative with each set associated with individual 2.27
Theorem 2. Let n = 2. If an SCS F ∈ F is ex-post implementable, then there exist
collections of sets S1 := {S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈ Θ2} and S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈ F, θ1 ∈ Θ1}
that are two-individual consistent with F under incomplete information.
Theorems 1 and 2 affirm the following economic intuition: if the designer cannot
identify sets from which individuals make choices compatible with the social goal, then
he/she cannot succeed in the corresponding implementation attempt. Furthermore,
27Item (iii) of two-individual consistency, is similar in spirit to part (i)− (a) of Condition β of Dutta
and Sen (1991), a paper presenting a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation with
two individuals under complete information in the rational domain.
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when attention is restricted to two individuals and ex-post implementation of an SCS
using a given two-individual consistent collections of sets is aimed, the set of messages
of an individual in a mechanism must be sufficiently rich to generate each set in the two-
individual consistent collection of sets of the other individual. Hence, the identification of
two-individual consistent collections of sets with the given SCS is needed when designing
mechanisms. Consequently, we now display how to identify such collections and the
practical implications of Theorem 2 pertaining to our motivating example. Recall that
the individual choices of Ann and Bob and the SCS under consideration are given in
Table 1 and Table 3, respectively.
Employing two-individual consistency, we investigate the prospective collections of
sets SA = {SA(f, ρB), SA(f, γB), SA(f ′, ρB), SA(f ′, γB)} for Ann and SB = {SB(f, ρA),
SB(f, γA), SB(f
′, ρA), SB(f ′, γA)} for Bob.
By (i) and (ii) of two-individual consistency, we narrow down the candidates for each
of these sets as follows. Let us start with Ann:
SA(f, ρB): f(ρA, ρB) = n and f(γA, ρB) = n imply n ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A (SA(f, ρB)) and n ∈
C
(γA,ρB)
A (SA(f, ρB)). There are four such sets: {c, n, s}, {c, n}, {n, s}, {n}.
SA(f, γB): f(ρA, γB) = n and f(γA, γB) = s imply n ∈ C(ρA,γB)A (SA(f, γB)) and s ∈
C
(γA,γB)
A (SA(f, ρB)). There is only one such set: {c, n, s}.
SA(f
′, ρB): f ′(ρA, ρB) = s and f ′(γA, ρB) = c imply s ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A (SA(f ′, ρB)) and c ∈
C
(γA,ρB)
A (SA(f
′, ρB)). There is only one such set as well: {c, s}.
SA(f
′, γB): f ′(ρA, γB) = s and f ′(γA, γB) = c imply s ∈ C(ρA,γB)A (SA(f ′, ρB)) and c ∈
C
(γA,γB)
A (SA(f
′, ρB)). There is only one such set: {c, s}.
Next comes Bob:
SB(f, ρA): f(ρA, ρB) = n and f(ρA, γB) = n imply n ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B (SB(f, ρA)) and n ∈
C
(ρA,γB)
B (SB(f, ρA)). There are two such sets: {c, n} and {n}.
SB(f, γA): f(γA, ρB) = n and f(γA, γB) = s imply n ∈ C(γA,ρB)B (SB(f, γA)) and s ∈
C
(γA,γB)
B (SB(f, γA)). There is only one such set: {n, s}.
SB(f
′, ρA): f ′(ρA, ρB) = s and f ′(ρA, γB) = s imply s ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B (SB(f ′, ρA)) and s ∈
C
(ρA,γB)
B (SB(f
′, ρA)). There are three such sets {c, s} and {n, s} and {s}.
SB(f
′, γA): f ′(γA, ρB) = c and f ′(γA, γB) = c imply c ∈ C(γA,ρB)B (SB(f ′, γA)) and c ∈
C
(γA,γB)
B (SB(f
′, γA)). There are two such sets {c, n} and {c}.
Therefore, we conclude that SA(f, γB) = {c, n, s}, SA(f ′, ρB) = {c, s}, SA(f ′, γB) =
{c, s}, and SB(f, γA) = {n, s}.
Furthermore, condition (iii) of two-individual consistency implies that SA(f, θB) ∩
SB(f
′, θA) 6= ∅ and SA(f ′, θB)∩SB(f, θA) 6= ∅ for each θA ∈ {ρA, γA} and θB ∈ {ρB, γB}.
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Thus, SA(f
′, ρB) ∩ SB(f, ρA) 6= ∅, and this implies SB(f, ρA) = {c, n}.
These uniquely identify 5 out of 8 of the two-individual consistent collections of sets
of Ann and Bob. In particular, we must have SA = {SA(f, ρB), {c, n, s}, {c, s}} and
SB = {{c, n}, {n, s}, SB(f ′, ρA), SB(f ′, γA)}. It is possible to narrow down SA and SB
further by employing condition (iv) of two-individual consistency. Yet, this would be
tedious since there are many deceptions to consider.28 However, the mechanism given in
Table 4 implementing F in our motivating example implies that the following collections
of sets are two-individual consistent with F under incomplete information:
SA: SA(f, ρB) = {c, n} SA(f, γB) = {c, n, s} SA(f ′, ρB) = {c, s} SA(f ′, γB) = {c, s}
SB: SB(f, ρA) = {c, n} SB(f, γA) = {n, s} SB(f ′, ρA) = {c, s} SB(f ′, γA) = {c, n}
Table 9: Two-individual consistent collections SA and SB for F .
The collections of sets SA and SB given in Table 9 are not the unique pair of two-
individual consistent collections of sets with F under incomplete information: SB(f
′, ρA)
can also be {n, s} instead of {c, s}.29 In Section 5.1, we identify another mechanism that
implies a different pair of two-individual consistent collections of sets for F .
Next, we show that our necessary conditions imply analogs of the necessary condi-
tions of the rational domain: an ex-post-choice monotonicity condition and a quasi-ex-
post choice incentive compatibility condition. Indeed, when individuals’ choices satisfy
the WARP, these conditions coincide with ex-post monotonicity and ex-post incentive
compatibility conditions of Bergemann and Morris (2008), respectively.
Definition 5. An SCS F ∈ F is ex-post choice monotonic if, for every SCF f ∈ F
and deception profile α with f ◦ α /∈ F , there is a state θ∗ ∈ Θ and an individual i∗ ∈ N
and a non-empty set of alternatives S∗ ∈ X such that
(i) f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (S∗), and
(ii) f((θ′i∗ , α−i∗(θ
∗
−i∗))) ∈ C
(θ′
i∗ ,α−i∗ (θ
∗
−i∗ ))
i∗ (S
∗) for all θ′i∗ ∈ Θi∗.
Proposition 1. If there exists a non-empty collection of sets consistent with an SCS
F ∈ F under incomplete information, then F is ex-post choice monotonic.
28There are 15 possible deceptions where either Ann or Bob misrepresents their types. All 15 of
them lead to f ◦ α 6= f and 12 of them lead to f ′ ◦ α 6= f ′. It is useful to note that deceptions are
non-cooperative and hence measurable only with respect to private information. Thus, we cannot have
α(ρA, ρB) = (γA, ρB) and α(ρA, γB) = (ρA, ρB) where Ann lies about her type when her type is ρA and
Bob’s type is ρB but not when her type is ρA and Bob’s type is γB .
29Two-individual consistent collections listed in Table 9 are obtained from σ′∗ and σ′′∗, the two
EPEs corresponding to f and f ′, respectively. SB(f ′, ρA) = {n, s} is obtained if σ′′′∗ —another EPE
corresponding to f ′—is considered.
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Ex-post choice monotonicity requires that when there is a deception leading to an
outcome not compatible with the state contingent allocations allowed by the SCS, there
exists an informant state and an informant whistle-blower for this state and an infor-
mant reward set for this whistle-blower such that (i) the whistle-blower does not choose
the outcome arising due to going along with the deception from the reward set at the
informant state; and (ii) the whistle-blower does not falsely accuse the other individuals
of deceiving when the outcome is compatible with the SCS at hand.
Definition 6. An SCS F ∈ F is quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatible if, for
every SCF f ∈ F and state θ ∈ Θ and individual i ∈ N , there exists a non-empty subset
of alternatives S ∈ X such that
(i) f(θ) ∈ Cθi (S), and
(ii) S ⊇ {f(θ′i, θ−i)|θ′i ∈ Θi}.
Proposition 2. If there exists a non-empty collection of sets consistent with an SCS F ∈
F under incomplete information, then F is quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatible.
The set {f(θ′i, θ−i) : θ′i ∈ Θi} ∈ X specifies the set of alternatives achievable by
individual i under an SCF f given others’ type profile θ−i. Quasi-ex-post choice incentive
compatibility of an SCS F demands that for every SCF f ∈ F and for every state θ ∈ Θ
and for every individual i ∈ N , there exists a set S from which i chooses f(θ) at θ while
S contains all the alternatives achievable by i under f given θ−i.
Quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatibility also describes a necessary condition for
partial ex-post implementation of an SCF f by taking F = {f} in Definition 6. As we
have shown in section 2.3, the revelation principle does not have to hold in our setup. In
fact, when the containment relation in (ii) of quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatibility
holds strictly, the revelation principle may fail. Consequently, Lemma 1 below identifies
a straightforward necessary and sufficient condition for the revelation principle.
Lemma 1. An SCF f is partially truthfully (ex-post) implementable in a direct mecha-
nism if and only if for every θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N , we have f(θ) ∈ Cθi ({f(θ′i, θ−i)|θ′i ∈ Θi}).
In general, the condition provided in Lemma 1 neither implies nor is implied by
the quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatibility condition. Yet, it is easy to see that if
the IIA holds, then quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatibility implies the revelation
principle.
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Proposition 3. If individual choices satisfy the IIA, then quasi-ex-post choice incentive
compatibility implies the revelation principle.
In summary, these establish that if a mechanism µ partially ex-post implements an
SCF f and individuals’ choices satisfy the IIA axiom, then there is a direct revela-
tion mechanism gd which partially implements the same SCF f in truthful EPE. Put
differently, the revelation principle holds whenever individuals’ choices satisfy the IIA.30
The failure of the revelation principle when individuals’ choices do not satisfy the
IIA leads us to search for indirect mechanisms, even for partial implementation. In this
context, our results identifying (indirect) mechanisms for full implementation are also
useful as full implementation implies partial implementation.
5 Simple Mechanisms
There has been a recent interest in simple mechanisms in the mechanism design
literature.31 Indeed, dealing with individuals having limited cognitive abilities increases
the relevance and importance of the simplicity of mechanisms.
Our findings concerning necessity lead us to lower bounds on the number of messages
needed for behavioral implementation under incomplete information. Considering the
number of messages of a mechanism as a measure of its simplicity, we elaborate on the
simplicity of mechanisms that can be used for ex-post implementation when individuals’
choices do not necessarily satisfy the standard axioms of rationality. We note that our
measure is not the only plausible measure of simplicity.
Before presenting our general results, we revisit the motivating example in order to
display our measure of simplicity at work.
5.1 Motivating example revisited
Consider the mechanism we employ in our motivating example presented in Section
2.1 in Table 4, which ex-post implements the SCS described in Table 3 for the individual
choices of Ann and Bob as specified in Table 1. Below, we establish that there does not
exist any simpler mechanism that implements that SCS in EPE.
30Saran (2011) studies conditions for revelation principle to hold when individuals have menu-
dependent preferences over interim Anscombe-Aumann acts. Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016) notes that
the revelation principle fails with intention-based social preferences.
31See for example, Li (2017) and Borgers and Li (2018).
21
To see why, consider the discussion on page 18 and recall that two-individual consis-
tency (see Definition 4) pins down 5 of 8 members of such collections of sets of Ann and
Bob: SA must be such that SA(f, γB) = {c, n, s}, SA(f ′, ρB) = {c, s}, and SA(f ′, γB) =
{c, s}; and SB must be such that SB(f, ρA) = {c, n}, and SB(f, γA) = {n, s}.
Fortunately, it is possible to see that our mechanism, presented in Table 4, is one of
the simplest mechanisms that ex-post implements F without any need to further narrow
down SA and SB by employing condition (iv) of two-individual consistency.
As SA(f, γB) must be {c, n, s}, Ann must have at least three messages to be able to
generate this opportunity set in any mechanism that ex-post implements F . Further-
more, Bob must have at least two messages: one for Ann to be able to generate {c, n, s}
and another for Ann to be able to generate {c, s} because SA(f ′, ρB) = SA(f ′, γB) =
{c, s}. So, the best we can hope for is three messages for Ann and two messages for Bob.
Below, we explain why we need at least one more message. Suppose that there
exists a mechanism that ex-post implements the SCS F where Ann has three messages
and Bob has two messages. This means we must have SA(f, ρB) = {c, n, s} and both
SB(f
′, ρA) and SB(f ′, γA) must be either {c, n} or {n, s}. Therefore, the collections
SA = {{c, n, s}, {c, s}} and SB = {{c, n}, {n, s}, SB(f ′, ρA), SB(f ′, γA)} hint to us that
the mechanism should look like the game form given in Table 10. In this mechanism,
Bob
Ann
{c, n, s} {c, s}
{c, n} x c
{n, s} y s
{t, z} z t
Table 10: A 3× 2 mechanism proposal for Ann and Bob.
the messages are labeled with the opportunity sets that the other individual should
be able to generate. This is because any message in a mechanism can be thought of
as an opportunity set generated for the other individual. For example, if Bob sends
the message on the left, then Ann should be able to generate the set {c, n, s}. Thus,
{x, y, z} = {c, n, s} and, hence, x 6= y 6= z. If Bob sends the message on the right, then
Ann should be able to obtain {c, s}, the other set in SA. On the other hand, if Ann
sends the message on top, then Bob should be able to generate {c, n}, and if Ann sends
the message in the middle, Bob should be able to generate {n, s}. Furthermore, each
outcome specified in the mechanism must be in both of the sustained opportunity sets
of each individual. In particular, if Ann sends {c, n} (sustaining the opportunity set
{c, n} ∈ SB for Bob) and Bob sends {c, s} (sustaining the opportunity set {c, s} ∈ SA
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for Ann), the outcome must be c as {c, n} ∩ {c, s} = {c}. So, for Bob to be able to
generate {c, n}, the outcome must be n whenever Ann sends {c, n} and Bob {c, n, s}.
Similarly, the outcome must equal s if Ann sends {n, s} and Bob {c, s} and hence the
outcome must equal n whenever Ann sends {n, s} and Bob {c, n, s}. Thus, we must
have x = n = y, a contradiction to x 6= y. Thus, the simplest mechanism cannot have
three messages for Ann and two for Bob. It must have at least one more message. This
makes the mechanism given in Table 4 one of the simplest mechanisms that ex-post
implements the SCS F described in Table 3 . We note this observation as a remark:
Remark 1. Given the individual choices of Ann and Bob in Table 1, any mechanism
that ex-post implements the SCS F described in Table 3 must have at least three messages
for Ann and the total number of messages for both players must be at least six. In this
regard, there does not exist any simpler mechanism than the one given in Table 4.
We note that the mechanism given in Table 4 is not the unique simplest mechanism
that works for our motivating example: the mechanism described in Table 11 also ex-post
implements the SCS F for the individual choices as specified in Table 1.32
Another observation of note is that this mechanism —unlike the one presented in
Table 4 — does not Nash implement (under complete information) the BR-optimal
alternatives: (M,M) is an NE at (ρA, ρB) resulting in c, a non-BR-optimal alternative
at (ρA, ρB).
Bob
Ann
L M R
U n c n
M c c c
D n s s
Table 11: Another simplest mechanism for Ann and Bob.
5.2 Lower bounds on the number of messages
In the proof of Theorem 1, the collection of sets S = {Si(f, θ−i)|f ∈ F, i ∈ N, θ−i ∈
Θ−i} consistent with the SCS F is constructed from a mechanism that ex-post imple-
ments F . When there are multiple such mechanisms, there could be different collections
of sets consistent with the same SCS. How many sets there are in a collection, and how
small these sets are, turn out to be important when designing simple mechanisms.
32The difference from Table 4 is that (M,M) leads to c instead of s. There is another two-individual
consistent collection of sets for F induced by this mechanism. The differences of these collections from
Table 9 are that SB(f
′, ρA) = {n, s} instead of {c, s} and SB(f ′, γA) = {c} instead of {c, n}.
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The observations made in Section 5.1 lead us to lower bounds on the number of
messages needed for behavioral implementation under incomplete information.
Let {Sγ}γ∈Γ be the set of all the collections of sets that satisfy consistency (or two-
individual consistency for the case of two individuals) represented by Sγ = {Sγi }i∈N for
each γ ∈ Γ with Sγi = {Sγi (f, θ−i)|f ∈ F, θ−i ∈ Θ−i}. Clearly, the goal of the planner is
to pick up one of these collections and design a mechanism that ex-post implements F .
The following provides the desired lower bounds:
Theorem 3. In any mechanism that ex-post implements the SCS F ∈ F ,
(i) the minimum number of messages required for individual i is minγ∈Γ maxS∈Sγi #S,
(ii) the minimum number of message profiles required for the individuals other than i
is minγ∈Γ #Sγi , and
(iii) the minimum number of total messages required for all individuals is
max
{
minγ∈Γ maxi∈N [#Sγi + maxS∈Sγi #S],minγ∈Γ
∑
i∈N maxS∈Sγi #S
}
.
The intuition behind Theorem 3 is simple: If the collection Sγ happens to be the
collection of opportunity sets generated by the mechanism that ex-post implements F ,
then individual i is able to generate any set in Sγi . Therefore, individual i must have at
least as many messages as the cardinality of the maximal set in Sγi , which implies (i).
At the same time, for each different set in the collection Sγi , there must exist a
particular message profile of the individuals other than i that should allow individual i
to generate this particular set, which implies (ii).
Therefore, if the collection Sγ happens to be the collection of opportunity sets gener-
ated by the mechanism that ex-post implements F , then the total number of messages
in this mechanism must be at least as much as maxi∈N [#Sγi + maxS∈Sγi #S]. On the
other hand, by (i), the total number of messages required in this mechanism for all the
individuals must be also more than
∑
i∈N maxS∈Sγi #S for the particular collection S
γ
i .
Combining together, the total number of messages must exceed both minγ∈Γ maxi∈N
[#Sγi + maxS∈Sγi #S] and minγ∈Γ
∑
i∈N maxS∈Sγi #S, which implies (iii).
6 Sufficiency
Ex-post implementation of an SCS F is not feasible when there is no collection of sets
consistent with F under incomplete information. Therefore, the planner should start
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the design by identifying such collections and then explore additional requirements to
be imposed on these collections for sufficiency. Below, we present such new conditions.33
6.1 Two Individuals
We proceed with sufficiency conditions for the case of two individuals. To move
forward, we need the following definition of relevant and irrelevant sets of alternatives
associated with an SCF f ∈ F and a type of one of the individuals:
Definition 7. For any i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, f ∈ F and θj ∈ Θj, we refer to the set
R(f, θj) := {f(θ′i, θj)|θ′i ∈ Θi} as the set of all relevant alternatives associated with the
SCF f ∈ F when the type of individual j is θj.34
Given collections of sets Si := {Si(f, θj)|f ∈ F, θj ∈ Θj} for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j
that are two-individual consistent with F under incomplete information, we refer to the
set Irr(f, θj) := Si(f, θj) \R(f, θj) as the set of irrelevant alternatives in Si(f, θj).
The following result displays a novel method turning necessity into sufficiency: Recall
that the message space of an individual in a mechanism is in one-to-one correspondence
with the related opportunity sets of the other individual. Thus, when designing the
mechanism to ex-post implement an SCS using a two-individual consistent collections of
sets, the planner has to ensure that the messages of each individual is rich enough to gen-
erate each set in the two-individual consistent collection of sets of the other individual.
As a result, a natural question involves the situation in which the message space of each
individual equals the two-individual consistent collection of sets of the other individual:
When is it sufficient that such mechanisms can ex-post implement the given SCS?35
We need the following for our next result: Given collections of sets Si := {Si(f, θj)|f ∈
F, θj ∈ Θj} for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, for each f, f ′ ∈ F with f 6= f ′ and θ′1 ∈ Θ1 and
θ2 ∈ Θ2, we define the viable set of alternatives associated with f, f ′ and θ′1, θ2 as follows
VS1,S2(f
′, f, θ′1, θ2) := (Irr(f, θ2) ∪ Irr(f ′, θ′1))
⋂
(S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ′1)) .
33We note that there is room for other sufficient conditions since we do not restrict individual choices
by requiring universal choice axioms. However, it seems neither easy nor practical to close the gap
between the necessary and sufficient conditions.
34R(f, θj) is also the opportunity set that individual i can generate in the direct mechanism when
individual j reveals his/her type to be θj ∈ Θj given that the SCF under consideration is f ∈ F .
35Extending Theorem 4 to the case with three or more individuals is not a trivial task: The joint
message profile of all the individuals but i, determine the opportunity set of i in a mechanism. This is
why we cannot ensure that unilateral deviations of an individual other than i can generate the consistent
collection of sets of individual i.
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In words, the viable set of alternatives are those that are appear both in S1(f, θ2) and
S2(f
′, θ′1) and are either irrelevant for f at θ2 or irrelevant for f
′ at θ′1.
36
Theorem 4. Let n = 2. If F ∈ F is an SCS for which there exist collections of sets
S1 := {S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈ Θ2} and S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈ F, θ1 ∈ Θ1} such that
(i) S1 and S2 are two-individual consistent with F under incomplete information, and
(ii) for any f, f ′ ∈ F with f 6= f ′ and θ′1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2, if VS1,S2(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2) = ∅,
then there is x ∈ S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ′1) with x /∈ C θ˜1(S1(f, θ2)) ∩ C θ˜2(S2(f ′, θ′1)) for
any θ˜ ∈ Θ, and
(iii) for any j ∈ {1, 2} and f ∈ F and θj ∈ Θj, if x ∈ Irr(f, θj), then there is
f ′ ∈ F with f ′ 6= f and θ′i ∈ Θi such that x ∈ Sj(f ′, θ′i) and x /∈ C θ˜i (Si(f, θj)) ∩
C θ˜j (Sj(f
′, θ′i)) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, and
either (iii.1) Si(f, θj) ∩ Sj(f ′, θ′i) = {x}
or (iii.2) Irr(f ′, θ′i) = {x}
or (iii.3) Irr(f, θj) = {x} and Irr(f ′, θ′i) = ∅,
then F is ex-post implementable by an #F#Θ1 ×#F#Θ2 mechanism.
Theorem 4, the proof of which employs the mechanism described in Section A.1,
establishes that two-individual consistency along with the following becomes sufficient:
Condition (ii) requires that, given the SCS F and the two-individual consistent collec-
tions of sets S1 and S2 and f, f ′ ∈ F with f 6= f ′ and θ′1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2, if none
of the alternatives that appear both in Si(f, θj) and Sj(f
′, θ′i) are irrelevant for f at θj
and for f ′ at θ′i, then there exists an alternative x ∈ Si(f, θj) ∩ Sj(f ′, θ′i) such that x
is not chosen either by individual i from Si(f, θj) or by individual j from Sj(f
′, θ′i) at
any state of the world θ˜ ∈ Θ. Condition (iii), given the SCS F and the two-individual
consistent collections of sets S1 and S2 and f ∈ F and θj ∈ Θj, demands that for any
irrelevant alternative x for f at θj, there exists f
′ ∈ F with f ′ 6= f and θ′i ∈ Θi such that
x ∈ Sj(f ′, θ′i) and x is not chosen either by individual i from Si(f, θj) or by individual j
from Sj(f
′, θ′i) at any state of the world θ˜ ∈ Θ with either (iii.1) x being the only alter-
native in Si(f, θj) and Sj(f
′, θ′i) or (iii.2) x being the only alternative that is irrelevant
in Sj(f
′, θ′i) or (iii.3) x being the only irrelevant alternative in Si(f, θj) and there is no
irrelevant alternative in Sj(f
′, θ′i).
36One can show that VS1,S2(f
′, f, θ′1, θ2) = (Irr(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ′1))
⋃
(Irr(f ′, θ′1) ∩ S1(f, θ2)).
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The intuition is as follows: If the conditions listed in Theorem 4 hold, then we can
construct a mechanism where the messages of an individual coincide with the sets in the
consistent collection of the other individual. Conditions (ii) and (iii) guarantee that
such a message space is rich enough to deliver all relevant and irrelevant alternatives
appropriately. On the other hand, two-individual consistency along with conditions (ii)
and (iii) ensures that the state contingent allocations obtained with ex-post equilibria
are in one-to-one correspondence with the SCS.
Another novelty of the mechanism that we construct is that it dispenses with the
integer/modulo game that is used in almost every other sufficiency proof in the literature.
Unfortunately, Theorem 4 does not apply to our motivating example:37 n ∈ Irr(f ′, γA)
as SB(f
′, γA) = {c, n} and R(f ′, γA) = {c}. Thus, we have to consider f and ρB as
well as f and γB to check condition (iii) of Theorem 4. However, SA(f, ρB) = {c, n}
and SA(f, γB) = {c, n, s} and n ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A (SA(f, ρB)) ∩ C(ρA,ρB)B (SB(f ′, γA)) and n ∈
C
(ρA,ρB)
A (SA(f, γB)) ∩ C(ρA,ρB)B (SB(f ′, γA)), implying (iii) of Theorem 4 fails.
To illustrate the relevance of Theorem 4, we provide the following example: The
individual choices of Amy and Bill over the set of alternatives X = {a, b, c} at state
θ ∈ Θ := ΘA×ΘB with ΘA = {θA, θ′A} and ΘB = {θB, θ′B} are as in Table 12. The SCS,
C
(θA,θB)
A C
(θA,θB)
B C
(θA,θ
′
B)
A C
(θA,θ
′
B)
B C
(θ′A,θB)
A C
(θ′A,θB)
B C
(θ′A,θ
′
B)
A C
(θ′A,θ
′
B)
B
{a, b, c} {a} {a} {a} {b} {b} {a} {b} {c}
{a, b} {b} {b} {b} {b} {b} {a} {b} {b}
{a, c} {a} {a} {a} {a} {a} {c} {a} {c}
{b, c} {b} {c} {c} {c} {c} {b} {c} {b}
Table 12: Individual choices of Amy and Bill.
F , involves counting the number of times an alternative is chosen at a given state of the
world θ by any one of the individuals from a subset of X: for any θ ∈ Θ, the winning
alternatives are W (θ) := arg maxx∈X #{S ∈ X : x ∈ Cθi (S), i = A,B}. Meanwhile, the
SCS, F = {f, f ′}, the planner intends to ex-post implement is as in Table 13:
(θA, θB) (θA, θ
′
B) (θ
′
A, θB) (θ
′
A, θ
′
B)
W (θ) {a} {a, b} {a, b} {b}
f a a a b
f ′ a b b b
Table 13: The social choice set F for Amy and Bill.
37Recall that the individual choices of Ann and Bob are as in Table 1 and the associated two-individual
consistent collections of sets SA and SB are as in Table 9.
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In Section C of the Appendix, we identify the two-individual consistent collections
of sets SA and SB (given in Table 20), and verify conditions (ii) and (iii) of Theorem
4. The construction in Section A.1 delivers the mechanism µ = (M, g) where MA =
{f, f ′} × {θA, θ′A}, MB = {f, f ′} × {θB, θ′B}, and g : M → X is as in Table 14.38
Bill
Amy
g SA(f, θB) SA(f, θ
′
B) SA(f
′, θB) SA(f ′, θ′B)
SB(f, θA) a a c a
SB(f, θ
′
A) a b a a
SB(f
′, θA) c c a b
SB(f
′, θ′A) c c b b
Table 14: The 4× 4 mechanism for Amy and Bill implied by Theorem 4.
A further implication of Theorem 4 is that if there is no irrelevant alternative in
any of the sets in the two-individual consistent collections S1 and S2, then condition (ii)
and (iii) hold vacuously and hence ex-post equilibrium of F in the direct mechanism
becomes feasible. This leads us to the following intuitive corollary regarding the (full)
ex-post implementation of an SCF:
Corollary 1. Let n = 2. If F = {f} for which there exist collections of sets S1 :=
{S1(f, θ2)|θ2 ∈ Θ2} and S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|θ1 ∈ Θ1} such that
(i) S1 and S2 are two-individual consistent with F under incomplete information, and
(ii) for any θ ∈ Θ, we have Si(f, θj) = R(f, θj), i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j,
then the SCF f is ex-post implementable by the direct revelation mechanism.
Corollary 1 implies that if there is no irrelevant alternative in any of the sets in the
associated two-individual consistent collections, then the SCF is not only partially but
also fully ex-post implementable by the direct revelation mechanism.
38In this construction, the relevant alternatives associated with f , f(θA, θB), f(θA, θ
′
B), f(θ
′
A, θB),
f(θ′A, θ
′
B) correspond to cells (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), and (2, 2) while the relevant alternatives associated
with f ′, f ′(θA, θB), f ′(θA, θ′B), f
′(θ′A, θB), f
′(θ′A, θ
′
B) correspond to cells (3, 3), (3, 4), (4, 3), and (4, 4),
respectively. The cells (1, 3), (3, 1), (3, 2), (4, 1), and (4, 2) equal to the irrelevant alternative c as c
satisfies (iii.2) of Theorem 4. The cell (1, 4) equals a since a satisfies (iii.1) of Theorem 4 as a ∈
Irr(f ′, θ′B), SA(f
′, θ′B) ∩ SB(f, θA) = {a}, and a /∈ C θ˜A(SA(f ′, θ′B)) ∩ C θ˜B(SB(f, θA)) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ.
The cell (2, 3) equals a as a satisfies (ii) of Theorem 4 since VSA,SB (f, f
′, θ′A, θB) = ∅, a ∈ SA(f ′, θB) ∩
SB(f, θ
′
A), and a /∈ C θ˜A(SA(f ′, θB)) ∩ C θ˜B(SB(f, θ′A)) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ. Finally, the cell (2, 4) equals a due
to a satisfying (iii.3) of Theorem 4 since Irr(f ′, θ′B) = {a}, Irr(f, θ′A) = ∅, and a /∈ C θ˜A(SA(f ′, θ′B)) ∩
C θ˜B(SB(f, θ
′
A)) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ.
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Next, we turn to other properties that can be used to transform the necessary con-
ditions into sufficient ones with two individuals.
The first of these concerns choice incompatibility for the case of two individuals.
Definition 8. Given an SCS F ∈ F , we say that F involves choice incompatibility
among a non-empty set of alternatives S ∈ X and non-empty collections of sets S1 :=
{S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈ Θ2} ⊂ X and S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈ F, θ1 ∈ Θ1} ⊂ X at state θ if
(i) x ∈ Cθi (S) implies x /∈ Cθj (S), i 6= j; and
(ii) for any T ∈ Si, x ∈ Cθi (T ) implies x /∈ Cθj (S), i = 1, 2 and i 6= j; and
(iii) for any deception profile α and any f, f ′ ∈ F with f 6= f ′, x ∈ Cθi (Si(f, αj(θj)))
implies x /∈ Cθj (Sj(f ′, αi(θi))), i = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Choice incompatibility conditions require that there is sufficiently strong disagree-
ment between the two individuals at a given state. Indeed, the intuition behind choice
incompatibility is as follows: An SCS F involves choice incompatibility among a non-
empty set of alternatives S and non-empty collections of sets S1 and S2 at state θ means
that the individual choices at θ are not aligned when (i) both individuals make choices
separately from S; and (ii) one individual, i, is making a choice from a set in Si and
the other individual, j, is making a choice from S where i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j; and (iii)
individual i makes a choice from a set in Si that is associated with a particular SCF f
and the other individual, j, makes a choice from a set in Sj which is associated with a
different SCF f ′ 6= f while f, f ′ ∈ F and i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j.39
At this stage, we wish to emphasize that we handle cases in which individuals’ choices
are aligned later in the section, when we start discussing choice unanimity.
Theorem 5, below, shows that two-individual consistency coupled with choice incom-
patibility is sufficient for ex-post implementation.
39Choice incompatibility has some relations with part (iv) of Condition µ2 of Moore and Repullo
(1990) and part (i)−(b) of Condition β of Dutta and Sen (1991); both among the necessary and sufficient
conditions for Nash implementation in the rational domain under complete information. These require
the existence of a common alternative x in the choice sets of the two individuals where the choice set
of the first individual is associated with a preference profile and alternative pair (R, a), while that of
the second with (R′, b) such that x being maximal with respect to some preference profile R′′ for both
of the individuals from these choice sets implies x being a member of the social choice correspondence
at R′′. On the other hand, choice incompatibility (akin to the economic environment assumption of
the rational domain with incomplete information) does not allow any alternative to be ranked first
by both individuals even when the two individuals’ choices are represented by complete and transitive
preferences. Thus, choice incompatibility brings about a requirement that is similar in spirit to part
(iv) of Condition µ2 and part (i)− (b) of Condition β.
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Theorem 5. Let n = 2. If F ∈ F is an SCS for which there exist
(i) collections of sets S1 := {S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈ Θ2} and S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈ F, θ1 ∈
Θ1} which are two-individual consistent with F under incomplete information, and
(ii) a set of alternatives X¯ ⊆ X with ⋃S∈ S1∪ S2 S ⊆ X¯ such that F involves choice
incompatibility among X¯ and S1 and S2 at every θ ∈ Θ,
then F is ex-post implementable.
In words, when there are two individuals, Theorem 5 implies that if (i) there exist
individual specific collections of sets S1 and S2 that are two-individual consistent with
F under incomplete information, and (ii) there exists a set of alternatives X¯ which
contains every alternative that appears in S1 and S2 and the afore discussed choice
incompatibility among X¯ and S1 and S2 hold at every state of the world, then F is
ex-post implementable. That is, Theorem 5 demands sufficiently “strong” disagreement
between the two individuals for sufficiency of ex-post implementation.40
The hypotheses of Theorem 5 enable us to sustain all EPE of the mechanism pre-
sented in Section A.2 under Rule 1 at every state of the world. We now provide another
set of sufficient conditions by employing the same mechanism, but allowing EPE to
arise under other rules as well. Because no-veto power is “hopelessly strong” with two
individuals (Moore & Repullo, 1990), we turn to the concept of choice unanimity.
Definition 9. We say that an SCS F ∈ F respects choice unanimity on a non-empty
set of alternatives S ∈ X and non-empty collections of sets S1 := {S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈
Θ2} ⊂ X and S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈ F, θ1 ∈ Θ1} ⊂ X at state θ if there exists f ∗ ∈ F
such that
(i) x ∈ Cθ1(S) ∩ Cθ2(S) implies f ∗(θ) = x; and
(ii) for any T ∈ Si, x ∈ Cθi (T ) ∩ Cθj (S) implies f ∗(θ) = x, for i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j;
and
(iii) for any deception profile α and f, f ′ ∈ F with f 6= f ′, x ∈ Cθi (Si(f, αj(θj))) ∩
Cθj (Sj(f
′, αi(θi))) implies f ∗(θ) = x.
40Ohashi (2012) presents sufficient conditions for ex-post implementation with two individuals in
the rational domain. Unlike ours, his sufficient conditions require the existence of a bad outcome: an
alternative that is strictly worse than any other in the union of the ranges of the SCFs in the SCS.
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The general intuition behind choice unanimity of an SCS F with two individuals is
that if the choices of the individuals (from some particular sets) agree at a given state,
then the SCS must respect this: the chosen alternatives must be achievable with one of
SCFs in the SCS at that state. It is a mild condition as it allows the SCS to accommodate
SCFs that are not restricted to deliver commonly agreed upon alternatives.
Our next sufficiency result for the case of two individuals makes use of the following
combination of consistency and choice unanimity:
Definition 10. Let n = 2. An SCS F ∈ F satisfies the consistency-unanimity
property whenever there exist collections of sets S1 := {S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈ Θ2} ⊂ X
and S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈ F, θ1 ∈ Θ1} ⊂ X such that
(i) for all f ∈ F , f(θ′1, θ2) ∈ C(θ
′
1,θ2)
1 (S1(f, θ2)) for each θ
′
1 ∈ Θ1, and
(ii) for all f ∈ F , f(θ1, θ′2) ∈ C(θ1,θ
′
2)
2 (S2(f, θ1)) for each θ
′
2 ∈ Θ2, and
(iii) for all f, f ′ ∈ F , S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ1) 6= ∅ for each θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2,
and there is a set of alternatives X¯ ⊆ X with ⋃S∈S1∪ S2 S ⊆ X¯ such that for any
collection of product sets {Θ¯f}f ∈F with Θ¯ =
⋃
f∈F Θ¯f ⊂ Θ,
(iv) F respects choice unanimity on X¯ and S1 and S2 at every θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯, and
(v) for all f ∈ F and deception profile α, if f(α(θ)) 6= f ∗(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯f where
f ∗ is the SCF that satisfies (i)–(iii) of choice unanimity, then there exists θ∗ ∈ Θ¯f
such that either f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f, α2(θ∗2))) or f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f, α1(θ∗1))).
Consistency-unanimity, in words, requires the following: Given an SCS F , there
exist collections of sets Si with the property that Si(f, θj) does not depend on θi for all
i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j and f ∈ F and θj ∈ Θj and a set of alternatives X¯ which contains
every alternative that appears in S1 ∪ S2 such that the following hold:
— Given any i ∈ {1, 2} and any f ∈ F and any θj ∈ Θj, it must be that i’s choice
from Si(f, θj) when he/she is of type θ
′
i at state (θ
′
i, θj) contains f(θ
′
i, θj) for all
θ′i ∈ Θi, with j = 1, 2 and i 6= j; and
— any set from S1 must have a common element with any set from S2; and
— for any collection of product sets of states {Θ¯f}f ∈F with Θ¯ =
⋃
f∈F Θ¯f ⊂ Θ, there
is an SCF f ∗ in F such that
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– F respects choice unanimity on X¯ and S1 and S2 whenever θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯; and
– for any deception profile α and SCF f ∈ F that lead to an outcome different
than f ∗(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯f where f ∗ is the SCF that satisfies the choice
unanimity conditions (i)–(iii), there exists a whistle-blower i∗ ∈ {1, 2} and
an informant state θ∗ ∈ Θ¯f such that i∗ does not choose at θ∗ the alternative
f(α(θ∗)) from Si∗(f, αj(θ∗j )) where j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i∗.
Below we establish that the consistency-unanimity property is sufficient for ex-post
implementation with two individuals. Indeed, it is a novel two-individual condition which
draws its motivation from three or more individuals sufficiency conditions, consistency-
no-veto of the current paper, monotonicity-no-veto of Jackson (1991), and ex post mono-
tonicity no veto of Bergemann and Morris (2008).
Theorem 6. Let n = 2. If an SCS F ∈ F satisfies the consistency-unanimity property,
then F is ex-post implementable.
We wish to emphasize that when F = {f}, i.e., the case in which the planner is
seeking to implement an SCF in EPE, then, (iii) of choice unanimity holds vacuously.41
This simplifies the hypotheses of Theorem 6 and delivers the following:
Corollary 2. Let n = 2. An SCF f : Θ → X is ex-post implementable whenever there
are collections of sets Si := {Si(f, θj)|θj ∈ Θj} ⊂ X with i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j such that
(i) f(θ′1, θ2) ∈ C(θ
′
1,θ2)
1 (S1(f, θ2)) for each θ
′
1 ∈ Θ1, and f(θ1, θ′2) ∈ C(θ1,θ
′
2)
2 (S2(f, θ1))
for each θ′2 ∈ Θ2, and S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f, θ1) 6= ∅ for each θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2,
and there is a set of alternatives X¯ ⊆ X with ⋃S∈S1∪ S2 S ⊆ X¯ such that for any product
set Θ¯ ⊆ Θ,
(ii) x ∈ Cθ1(X¯) ∩ Cθ2(X¯) implies f(θ) = x, x ∈ Cθ1(T ) ∩ Cθ2(X¯) with T ∈ S1 implies
f(θ) = x, and x ∈ Cθ1(X¯) ∩ Cθ2(T ′) with T ′ ∈ S2 implies f(θ) = x, for each
θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯, and
(iii) for any deception profile α, if f(α(θ)) 6= f(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯, then there exists θ∗ ∈
Θ¯ such that either f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f, α2(θ∗2))) or f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f, α1(θ∗1))).
In what follows, we briefly elaborate on the relation of our motivating example to
Theorems 5 and 6. The individual choices of Ann and Bob specified in Table 1 and
41We note that when F = {f}, Rule 3 of the mechanism presented in Section A.2 becomes redundant.
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collections of sets SA and SB satisfy neither choice incompatibility of Theorem 5 nor
consistency-unanimity of Theorem 6.42 These establish that our sufficiency conditions
for the case of two individuals are not necessary in general. To see why, consider the
individual choices of Ann from the set SA(f, ρB) = {c, n}, and of Bob from the set
X¯ = {c, n, s} at state (γA, γB). Ann chooses n from SA(f, ρB), whereas Bob chooses
both n and s from the set X¯ at (γA, γB). As n is chosen by both, choice incompatibility
fails at (γA, γB). Thus, we turn to consistency-unanimity to be able to employ the
mechanism of Section A.2 to deliver sufficiency. However, there is no SCF f ∗ ∈ F in the
SCS F such that f ∗(γA, γB) = n. Therefore, consistency-unanimity fails as well.
To demonstrate the applicability of Theorem 6, below, we show how Corollary 2 can
be employed on an example that is inspired from Masatlioglu and Ok (2014).43
Suppose that the states of the world regarding the individual choices of Ann and
Bob are given by Θ = {(♦,♦), (♦, c), (c,♦), (c, c)}. That is, ΘA = ΘB = {♦, c}, where
type ♦ stands for not having a status-quo and type c stands for status-quo being coal.
We consider the individual choices of Ann and Bob from (the subsets) of X = {c, n, s}
as specified in Table 15.
S C
(♦,♦)
A C
(♦,♦)
B C
(♦,c)
A C
(♦,c)
B C
(c,♦)
A C
(c,♦)
B C
(c,c)
A C
(c,c)
B
{c, n, s} {s} {s} {s} {n} {n} {s} {n} {n}
{c, n} {n} {n} {n} {n} {n} {n} {n} {n}
{c, s} {s} {s} {s} {c} {c} {s} {c} {c}
{n, s} {s} {s} {s} {s} {s} {s} {n} {n}
Table 15: A two-individual example satisfying consistency-unanimity.
A social planner wants to ex-post implement the SCF f , a particular selection from
the BR-optimal outcomes, described in Table 16: The social planner breaks the tie in
favor of s whenever n and s are both BR-optimal.
State (♦,♦) (♦, c) (c,♦) (c, c)
BR-optimal {s} {n, s} {n, s} {n}
f s s s n
Table 16: BR-optimal alternatives and SCF f .
Indeed, the planer can employ the mechanism described in Section A.2 to implement
42Recall that the consistent collections SA is given as SA(f, ρB) = {c, n}, SA(f, γB) = {c, n, s},
SA(f
′, ρB) = {c, s}, SA(f ′, γB) = {c, s} and SB is given as SB(f, ρA) = {c, n}, SB(f, γA) = {n, s},
SB(f
′, ρA) = {c, s}, SB(f ′, γA) = {c, n}. Consequently, X¯ = {c, n, s}.
43Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) presents a “model of individual decision making when the endowment
of an agent provides a reference point that may influence her choices.”
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the SCF f in ex-post equilibrium: In Section D of the Appendix, we show that the
collections SA := {SA(f,♦), SA(f, c)} and SB := {SB(f,♦), SB(f, c)} with SA(f,♦) =
{n, s}, SA(f, c) = {c, n, s} and SB(f,♦) = {n, s}, SB(f, c) = {c, n, s} satisfy conditions
(i), (ii), and (iii) of Corollary 2.
6.2 Three or more individuals
Next, we identify sufficient conditions for ex-post implementation when there are at
least three individuals.
Definition 11. We say that a non-empty set of alternatives S ∈ X satisfies the choice
incompatible pair property at state θ if for each alternative x ∈ S there exist indi-
viduals i, j ∈ N such that x /∈ Cθi (S) and x /∈ Cθj (S).
This condition implies some level of disagreement among individuals regarding the
socially optimal alternatives at a given state of the world. In words, a set satisfies the
choice incompatible pair property at a state, if for each alternative in this set there exists
a pair of individuals who do not choose this alternative from this set at that state. Then,
any alternative in this set can be chosen by at most n− 2 individuals at this state.44
The choice incompatible pair property plays an important role in Theorem 7: This
property coupled with consistency are sufficient for ex-post implementation.
Theorem 7. Let n ≥ 3. If F ∈ F is an SCS for which there exist
(i) a collection of sets S := {Si(f, θ−i) : i ∈ N, f ∈ F, θ−i ∈ Θ−i} consistent with F
under incomplete information, and
(ii) a set of alternatives X¯ ⊆ X with ⋃S∈S S ⊆ X¯ which satisfies the choice incom-
patible pair property at every state θ ∈ Θ,
then F is ex-post implementable.
In words, Theorem 7 establishes the following when there are three or more indi-
viduals who are not in perfect agreement concerning the socially optimal alternatives:
If (i) there exists a collection of sets S consistent with an SCS F under incomplete in-
formation, and (ii) there exists a set of alternatives X¯ which contains every alternative
that appears in S and satisfies the choice incompatible pair property at every state of
44The choice incompatible pair property is similar to the economic environment assumption in the
rational domain. Yet, it is weaker in our setup since it is now defined on a particular set.
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the world, then F is ex-post implementable. Indeed, any alternative that is not in X¯ is
non-essential for the design problem.
Theorem 7 identifies conditions that make sure that all EPE of the mechanism de-
scribed in Section A.3 falls under Rule 1 at every state of the world. Below, we provide
another set of sufficient conditions by employing the same mechanism, but this time
allowing for EPE to arise under Rule 2 and Rule 3 as well. To do so, we turn to the
counterpart of the no-veto power property in our environment.
Definition 12. We say that an SCF f satisfies the choice no-veto-power property
on a non-empty set of alternatives S ∈ X at state θ ∈ Θ if x ∈ Cθi (S) for all i ∈ N \{j}
for some j ∈ N implies f(θ) = x.
The choice-no-veto power property on a set, at a particular state, requires that if an
alternative is chosen from this set by at least n − 1 individuals at the particular state,
then this alternative must be f -optimal at this particular state.
Our second sufficiency result for the case of three or more individuals employs a
combination of consistency and the choice no-veto-power property. Below, we present
this sufficiency condition followed by the result.45
Definition 13. An SCS F ∈ F satisfies the consistency-no-veto property whenever
there exist
(i) a collection of sets S := {Si(f, θ−i) : i ∈ N, f ∈ F, θ−i ∈ Θ−i} such that for all
f ∈ F and for all i ∈ N , f(θ′i, θ−i) ∈ C(θ
′
i,θ−i)
i (Si(f, θ−i)) for each θ
′
i ∈ Θi,
(ii) and a set of alternatives X¯ ⊆ X with ⋃S∈S S ⊆ X¯
such that for any collection of product sets of states {Θ¯f}f ∈F with Θ¯ =
⋃
f∈F Θ¯f ⊂ Θ,
there exists f ∗ ∈ F such that
(iii) f ∗ satisfies choice no-veto-power property on X¯ at every θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯, and
(iv) if for any f ∈ F and any deception profile α, f(α(θ)) 6= f ∗(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯f ,
then there exists i∗ ∈ N and θ∗ ∈ Θ¯f such that f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ∗−i∗))).
Theorem 8. Let n ≥ 3. If an SCS F ∈ F satisfies the consistency-no-veto property,
then F is ex-post implementable.
45The set Θ¯ ⊆ Θ is a product set whenever Θ¯ = ×i∈N Θ¯i where Θ¯i ⊆ Θi with the convention that
Θ¯ = ∅ whenever Θ¯i = ∅ for some i ∈ N .
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Given an SCS F , the consistency-no-veto property, in words, requires the existence
of a collection of sets S with the property that Si(f, θ−i) does not depend on θi for all
i ∈ N and f ∈ F and θ−i ∈ Θ−i and a set of alternatives X¯ which contains every
alternative that appears in S such that the following hold:
— Given any i ∈ N and any f ∈ F and any θ−i ∈ Θ−i, it must be that i’s choices
from Si(f, θ−i) when he/she is of type θ′i at state (θ
′
i, θ−i) contains f(θ
′
i, θ−i) for all
θ′i ∈ Θi; and
— for any collection of product sets of states {Θ¯f}f ∈F with Θ¯ =
⋃
f∈F Θ¯f ⊂ Θ, there
is an SCF f ∗ in F such that
– if θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯, then f ∗ obeys the choice no-veto-power property on X¯ at θ, and
– if a deception profile α and an SCF f ∈ F lead to an outcome different than
f ∗(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯f , then there exists a whistle-blower i∗ ∈ N and an
informant state θ∗ such that i∗ does not choose at θ∗ the alternative f(α(θ∗))
(the alternative generated by this deception at θ∗) from Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ∗−i∗)).
Evidently, the consistency-no-veto property is analogous to the monotonicity-no-
veto condition of Jackson (1991) and the ex post monotonicity no veto property of
Bergemann and Morris (2008). Moreover, our findings are parallel with these papers in
the following sense: Jackson (1991) considers a rational domain with expected utility
maximizing individuals and establishes that monotonicity-no-veto and incentive com-
patibility and a condition called closure are sufficient for the Bayesian implementation
of SCSs. Meanwhile, Bergemann and Morris (2008) providing sufficiency conditions for
ex-post implementation in the rational domain employs ex-post monotonicity no veto
condition and ex-post incentive compatibility, both of which are “ex-post analogs of the
Bayesian implementation” conditions. In our setting, the closure condition is trivially
satisfied as in Bergemann and Morris (2008); by repeating the same arguments presented
in the proof of Proposition 2, one can easily show that quasi-ex-post choice incentive
compatibility is implied by (i) of the consistency-no-veto property.
A due remark concerns the cases when attention is restricted to the behavioral ex-
post implementation of an SCF. Then, the hypotheses of Theorem 8 simplify to deliver
the following analog of Theorem 3 of Bergemann and Morris (2008):
Corollary 3. Let n ≥ 3. An SCF f : Θ → X is ex-post implementable whenever
there exists a collection of sets S := {Si(f, θ−i) : i ∈ N, θ−i ∈ Θ−i} such that for all
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individuals i ∈ N , f(θ′i, θ−i) ∈ C(θ
′
i,θ−i)
i (Si(f, θ−i)) for each θ
′
i ∈ Θi, and there exists a set
of alternatives X¯ ⊆ X with ⋃S∈S S ⊆ X¯ such that for any product set of states Θ¯ ⊂ Θ,
(i) f satisfies choice no-veto-power property on X¯ at every θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯, and
(ii) for any deception profile α with f(α(θ)) 6= f(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯, there exists i∗ ∈ N
and θ∗ ∈ Θ¯ such that f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ∗−i∗))).
7 Concluding Remarks
We investigate the problem of implementation under incomplete information when
individuals’ choices need not satisfy the standard axioms of rationality.
The focus is on full implementation in ex-post equilibrium because (i) the revelation
principle fails for partial implementation, and hence, one cannot restrict attention to
direct revelation mechanisms without a loss of generality; and (ii) the concept of ex-
post equilibrium is belief-free, does not require any expectation considerations or any
belief updating, and is robust to informational assumptions regarding the environment,
which makes it well suited when individuals’ choices violate the WARP.
We provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for the case of two individu-
als and for the case of three or more individuals separately. Moreover, our necessary
conditions provide us with hints regarding the limits of simplicity for behavioral imple-
mentation under incomplete information.
An interesting direction for future research would be to analyze whether practical
and simple mechanisms are available for specific types of behavioral biases. We hope
that our results pave the way for contributions in this direction.
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A Mechanisms
A.1 The first mechanism for the case with two individuals
To ex-post implement a given SCS, F , with two individuals, the planner needs a
two-individual consistent pair of collections of sets S1 and S2 with F under incomplete
information, and a mechanism that induces the sets in S1 and S2 as opportunity sets
for individuals 1 and 2, respectively. That is, for any set in S2, individual 1 must
have a message that generates this set as an opportunity set for individual 2 in the
mechanism, and vice versa. Thanks to the hypotheses of Theorem 4, we construct the
following mechanism with the property that the messages of individual i coincides with
Sj, i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j; and prove in Section B.6 that this mechanism can be used to
ex-post implement F .
Given S1 and S2, we construct our #F#Θ1 × #F#Θ2 mechanism µ = (M, g) as
follows: For each f, f ′ ∈ F with f 6= f ′ and θ′1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2, recall that
VS1,S2(f
′, f, θ′1, θ2) := (Irr(f, θ2) ∪ Irr(f ′, θ′1))
⋂
(S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ′1)) .
If VS1,S2(f
′, f, θ′1, θ2) = ∅, then pick x˜(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2) ∈ S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ′1) such that
x˜(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2) /∈ C θ˜1(S1(f, θ2)) ∩ C θ˜2(S2(f ′, θ′1)) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ; such an x˜(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2)
exists due to condition (ii) of Theorem 4. On the other hand, if VS1,S2(f
′, f, θ′1, θ2) 6= ∅,
then fix z(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2) ∈ VS1,S2(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2) arbitrarily.
For any x ∈ Irr(f, θ2), let T1(x, f, θ2) ⊂ F × Θ1 be the set of f (x,f,θ2) ∈ F \
{f} and θ(x,f,θ2)1 ∈ Θ1 such that x ∈ S2(f (x,f,θ2), θ(x,f,θ2)1 ) and x /∈ C θ˜1(S1(f, θ2)) ∩
C θ˜2(S2(f
(x,f,θ2), θ
(x,f,θ2)
1 )) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ, with either (iii.1) or (iii.2) or (iii.3) holds. Sim-
ilarly, for any y ∈ Irr(f ′, θ′1), let T2(y, f ′, θ′1) ⊂ F ×Θ2 be the set of f (y,f ′,θ′1) ∈ F \ {f ′}
and θ
(y,f ′,θ′1)
2 ∈ Θ2 such that y ∈ S1(f (y,f ′,θ′1), θ(y,f
′,θ′1)
2 ) and y /∈ C θ˜1(S1(f (y,f ′,θ′1), θ(y,f
′,θ′1)
2 ))∩
C θ˜2(S2(f
′, θ′1)) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ, with either (iii.1) or (iii.2) or (iii.3) holds. The non-
emptiness of T1(x, f, θ2) and T2(y, f
′, θ′1), i.e., the existence of an f
(x,f,θ2) ∈ F \ {f}
and a θ
(x,f,θ2)
1 ∈ Θ1 and an f (y,f ′,θ′1) ∈ F \ {f ′} and a θ(y,f
′,θ′1)
2 ∈ Θ2 follows from con-
dition (iii) of Theorem 4. Observe that x = y whenever (f ′, θ′1) ∈ T1(x, f, θ2) and
(f, θ2) ∈ T2(y, f ′, θ′1). This follows from: (f ′, θ′1) ∈ T1(x, f, θ2) implies that (iii.3) cannot
hold for x since y ∈ Irr(f ′, θ′1). Similarly, (f, θ2) ∈ T2(y, f ′, θ′1) implies that (iii.3) cannot
hold for y since x ∈ Irr(f, θ2). If (iii.1) holds for x or y, since x, y ∈ S1(f, θ2)∩S2(f ′, θ′1),
x = y. On the other hand, if (iii.2) holds for x, then {x} = Irr(f ′, θ′1), hence, x = y.
Similarly, if (iii.2) holds for y, then {y} = Irr(f, θ2), thus, y = x.
Let the message spaces of individuals 1 and 2 be M1 = F × Θ1 and M2 = F × Θ2,
respectively. The outcome function g : M → X is as given in Table 17.
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Rule 1 : g(m) = f(θ′1, θ2)
if m1 = (f, θ
′
1),
m2 = (f, θ2);
Rule 2 : g(m) = x˜(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2)
if VS1,S2(f
′, f, θ′1, θ2) = ∅
m1 = (f, θ
′
1),
m2 = (f, θ2)
with f 6= f ′;
Rule 3 : g(m) =

x if x ∈ Irr(f, θ2) and
(f ′, θ′1) ∈ T1(x, f, θ2),
y if y ∈ Irr(f ′, θ′1) and
(f, θ2) ∈ T2(y, f ′, θ′1),
z(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2) otherwise.
if VS1,S2(f
′, f, θ′1, θ2) 6= ∅
m1 = (f
′, θ′1),
m2 = (f, θ2),
with f 6= f ′.
Table 17: The outcome function of the #F#Θ1 ×#F#Θ2 mechanism.
Rule 1 ensures that if the first entries of both individuals’ messages are f ∈ F , then
the outcome is determined according f and the reported type profiles in the messages.
Rule 2 implies that if the first entries of both individuals’ messages are different and
the viable set of alternatives associated with these messages, VS1,S2(f
′, f, θ′1, θ2), is empty,
then the outcome is the alternative x˜(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2) ∈ S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ′1) possessing the
property that x˜(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2) /∈ C θ˜1(S1(f, θ2)) ∩ C θ˜2(S2(f ′, θ′1)) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ.
In the remaining cases, i.e., when the first entries of both individuals’ messages are
different and the viable set of alternatives associated with the messages, VS1,S2(f
′, f, θ′1, θ2),
is non-empty, Rule 3 applies. In this case, the outcome is a member of Irr(f, θ2) ∪
Irr(f ′, θ′1) and equals: (1) x if x is irrelevant for f at θ2 while (f
′, θ′1) is such that (iii)
of Theorem 4 holds for x ∈ Irr(f, θ2), i.e., (f ′, θ′1) ∈ T1(x, f, θ2); (2) y if y is irrele-
vant for f ′ at θ′1 while (f, θ2) is such that (iii) of Theorem 4 holds for y ∈ Irr(f ′, θ′1),
i.e., (f, θ2) ∈ T2(y, f ′, θ′1); and (3) z(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2), a fixed element of VS1,S2(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2),
otherwise. Note that the outcome function g under Rule 3 is well-defined since x = y
whenever (f ′, θ′1) ∈ T1(x, f, θ2) and (f, θ2) ∈ T2(y, f ′, θ′1).
A.2 The second mechanism for the case with two individuals
The other mechanism we design for the case of two individuals relies on the following
observations: (i) the outcome should be f(θ) when there is agreement between the two
individuals over f ∈ F and the true state is θ; (ii) each individual i should be able to
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generate unilaterally the set Si(f, θj) when the other individual j 6= i intends a particular
SCF f ∈ F and sends a message as if his/her type is θj ∈ Θj; (iii) whenever there is
an attempt to deceive the designer so that an undesired outcome is to be implemented,
a whistle-blower should be able to alert the designer; (iv) undesirable EPE should be
eliminated according to a procedure, e.g., a modulo game or an integer game.
Consider any F ∈ F for which S1 := {S1(f, θ2)|f ∈ F, θ2 ∈ Θ2}, S2 := {S2(f, θ1)|f ∈
F, θ1 ∈ Θ1}, and X¯ are as specified in Theorem 5 or Theorem 6.
For any i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, f ∈ F , θj ∈ Θj, let x¯(i, f, θj) be an arbitrary
alternative in Si(f, θj).
For any f, f ′ ∈ F , θ1 ∈ Θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ2, let x¯(f, f ′, θ1, θ2) be an arbitrary alter-
native in S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ1). Such an alternative x¯(f, f ′, θ1, θ2) ∈ X¯ exists since
S1(f, θ2)∩S2(f ′, θ1) is non-empty for each θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2, by (iii) of two-individual
consistency (see Definition 4).
The mechanism we employ is denoted by µ = (M, g) where the message space of
individual i is Mi = {0, 1} × F × Θi × X¯ × {0, 1} and the outcome function equals
g : M → X. A generic message is denoted by mi = (ni, fi, θi, xi, ki). That is, each
individual message’s first entry and last entry is required to be either 0 or 1, and each
individual i is required to send a message that specifies an SCF f ∈ F , a type θi ∈ Θi,
an alternative xi ∈ X¯.46 The outcome function g is specified in Table 18.
Rule 1 indicates that if the first entries of both individuals’ messages are 0 and there
is agreement between the two individuals’ messages regarding the SCF, then the outcome
is determined according to this SCF and the reported type profile in the messages.
Rule 2.1 and Rule 2.2 indicate that if the first entry of the individual messages do not
coincide, then the outcome is the alternative proposed by individual i whose message’s
first entry is 1 whenever this alternative is in Si(fj, θj) where j 6= i is the individual
whose message’s first entry is 0. Otherwise, the outcome is x¯(i, fj, θj), also in Si(fj, θj).
Rule 3.1 and Rule 3.2 indicate that whenever the first entries of both individuals’
messages are 0 but there is no agreement between the individuals’ messages regarding
the SCF, i.e., f1 6= f2, the outcome is x¯(f1, f2, θ1, θ2) ∈ S1(f2, θ2) ∩ S2(f1, θ1), which is
non-empty due to (iii) of two-individual consistency.
Rule 4 indicates that if the first entries of both individuals’ messages are 1, then the
outcome is determined according to the sum of the last entries of the messages. If this
sum is odd, then the outcome is the alternative proposed by individual 1 and if this sum
46In our mechanism, the first entry of the message of individual i, ni ∈ {0, 1} with i = 1, 2, parallels
with the “flag” or “no flag” choice featured in the mechanism of Dutta and Sen (1991).
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Rule 1 : g(m) = f(θ)
if mi = (0, f, θi, ·, ·)
for both i ∈ {1, 2};
Rule 2.1 : g(m) =
{
x1 if x1 ∈ S1(f2, θ2)
x¯(1, f2, θ2) otherwise,
if m1 = (1, f1, θ1, x1, ·),
m2 = (0, f2, θ2, x2, ·);
Rule 2.2 : g(m) =
{
x2 if x2 ∈ S2(f1, θ1)
x¯(2, f1, θ1) otherwise,
if m1 = (0, f1, θ1, x1, ·),
m2 = (1, f2, θ2, x2, ·);
Rule 3 : g(m) = x¯(f1, f2, θ1, θ2)
if m1 = (0, f1, θ1, x1, k1),
m2 = (0, f2, θ2, x2, k2),
with f1 6= f2;
Rule 4 : g(m) = xj
if m1 = (1, f1, θ1, x1, k1),
m2 = (1, f2, θ2, x2, k2),
j =
{
1 if k1 + k2 is odd,
2 if k1 + k2 is even.
Table 18: The outcome function of the second two-individual mechanism.
is even, the outcome is the alternative proposed by individual 2.
When ex-post implementation of an SCF is desired, i.e., #F = 1, then (iii) of choice
incompatibility holds vacuously while Rule 3 of our mechanism becomes redundant. This
simplifies our proofs by eliminating discussions and arguments about Rule 3.
A.3 The mechanism for the case with three or more individuals
The mechanism we construct for the case with three or more individuals makes use
of the following observations: (i) the outcome should be f(θ) when there is unanimous
agreement between the individuals over f ∈ F and the true state is θ; (ii) under such a
unanimous agreement each individual j should be able to generate unilaterally the set
Sj(f, θ−j), i.e., when all other individuals (all i 6= j) have unanimously decided on the
particular SCF f ∈ F and sending messages as if their types are θ−j ∈ Θ−j, j should be
able to generate Sj(f, θ−j); (iii) whenever there is an attempt to deceive the designer so
that an outcome not compatible with the SCS is to be implemented, a whistle-blower
should be able to alert the designer; (iv) undesirable EPE should be eliminated according
to some procedure, e.g., by a modulo game or an integer game.47
47The mechanism we construct is similar to those that have been used for sufficiency proofs in the
implementation literature. See for example, Repullo (1987), Saijo (1988), Moore and Repullo (1990),
Jackson (1991), Danilov (1992), Maskin (1999), Bergemann and Morris (2008), de Clippel (2014), Koray
and Yildiz (2018), among others.
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Consider an SCS F ∈ F for which the collection of sets S := {Si(f, θ−i) : i ∈ N, f ∈
F, θ−i ∈ Θ−i} and X¯ are as specified in Theorem 7 or Theorem 8. For any i ∈ N , f ∈ F ,
θ−i ∈ Θ−i, let x¯(i, f, θ−i) be an arbitrary alternative in Si(f, θ−i).
The mechanism µ = (M, g) is defined as follows: The message space of each individual
i ∈ N is Mi = F ×Θi× X¯×N , while a generic message is denoted by mi = (f, θi, xi, ki),
and the outcome function g : M → X is as specified in Table 19.
Rule 1 : g(m) = f(θ) if mi = (f, θi, ·, ·) for all i ∈ N,
Rule 2 : g(m) =
{
xj if xj ∈ Sj(f, θ−j),
x¯(j, f, θ−j) otherwise.
if mi = (f, θi, ·, ·) for all i ∈ N \ {j}
and mj = (f˜, θ˜j, xj, ·) with f˜ 6= f,
Rule 3 : g(m) = xj where j =
∑
i ki (mod n) otherwise.
Table 19: The outcome function of the mechanism with three or more individuals.
In words, each individual is required to send a message that specifies an SCF f ∈ F ,
a type for himself θi ∈ Θi, an alternative xi in X¯, and a number ki ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Rule 1 indicates that if there is unanimity among the individuals’ messages regarding
the SCF to be implemented, then the outcome is determined according to this SCF and
the reported type profile in the messages.
Rule 2 indicates that if there is agreement between all the individuals but one re-
garding the SCF f ∈ F in their messages, then the outcome is determined according to
the alternative proposed by the odd-man-out, j, only if this alternative is in Sj(f, θ−j),
otherwise the outcome is x¯(j, f, θ−j) which is in Sj(f, θ−j) as well. That is, as desired,
when all the other individuals (all i 6= j) have unanimously decided on the particular
SCF f ∈ F and sending messages as if their types are θ−j ∈ Θ−j, the odd-man-out j is
able to generate unilaterally Sj(f, θ−j)—and nothing else since x¯(i, f, θ−i) ∈ Sj(f, θ−j)
as well.
Finally, Rule 3 applies when both Rule 1 and Rule 2 fail, then the outcome is deter-
mined only according to the reported numbers (ki’s) and the outcome xj is implemented
where j is the individual
∑
i ki modulo n. Rule 3 makes sure that there are no undesir-
able EPE of the mechanism.
We need at least three individuals for our mechanism to be well defined. Otherwise,
Rule 2 in the mechanism becomes ambiguous.
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B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Claim 1
We identify all EPE of µ = (M, g) by a case by case analysis on what Ann plays
when her type is ρA. Let σ
∗ be an ex-post equilbirium of µ = (M, g).
Case 1. If σ∗A(ρA) = U : Then, O
µ
B(σ
∗
A(ρA)) = {c, n}. At (ρA, ρB) and (ρA, γB), Bob
chooses n from the set {c, n}. Thus, σ∗B(ρB) and σ∗B(γB) must be either L or R.
Subcase 1.1. If σ∗B(ρB) = L and σ
∗
B(γB) = L: Then, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = n = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = O
µ
A(σ
∗
B(γB)) = {c, n}. At (γA, ρB), Ann chooses n from {c, n}
and hence σ∗A(γA) must be either U or D. But, at (γA, γB), Ann chooses c from {c, n}
which implies σ∗A(γA) must be M , a contradiction.
Subcase 1.2. If σ∗B(ρB) = L and σ
∗
B(γB) = R: Then, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = n = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = {c, n} and OµA(σ∗B(γB)) = {c, n, s}. At (γA, ρB), Ann chooses n
from {c, n}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be either U or D. At (γA, γB), Ann chooses c
and s from {c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be M or D. So, σ∗A(γA) = D.
Indeed the following observations imply that our first EPE is σ′∗ such that σ′∗A(ρA) =
U , σ′∗A(γA) = D, and σ
′∗
B(ρB) = L, σ
′∗
B(γB) = R
At (ρA, ρB) : n ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(ρA, ρB)) ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A (OµA(σ′∗B(ρB))),
n ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(ρA, ρB)) ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B (OµB(σ′∗A(ρA))).
At (ρA, γB) : n ∈ C(ρA,γB)A ({c, n, s}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(ρA, γB)) ∈ C(ρA,γB)A (OµA(σ′∗B(γB))),
n ∈ C(ρA,γB)B ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(ρA, γB)) ∈ C(ρA,γB)B (OµB(σ′∗A(ρA))).
At (γA, ρB) : n ∈ C(γA,ρB)A ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(γA, ρB)) ∈ C(γA,ρB)A (OµA(σ′∗B(ρB))),
n ∈ C(γA,ρB)B ({n, s}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(γA, ρB)) ∈ C(γA,ρB)B (OµB(σ′∗A(γA))).
At (γA, γB) : s ∈ C(γA,γB)A ({c, n, s}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(γA, γB)) ∈ C(γA,γB)A (OµA(σ′∗B(γB))),
s ∈ C(γA,γB)B ({n, s}) =⇒ g(σ′∗(γA, γB)) ∈ C(γA,γB)B (OµB(σ′∗A(γA))).
Subcase 1.3. If σ∗B(ρB) = R and σ
∗
B(γB) = L: Then, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = n = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = {c, n, s} and OµA(σ∗B(γB)) = {c, n}. At (γA, ρB), Ann chooses n
from {c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be U . On the other hand, at (γA, γB), Ann
chooses n from {c, n}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be U or D. Therefore, we must have
σ∗A(γA) = U . This implies O
µ
B(σ
∗
A(γA)) = {c, n}. But, at (γA, ρB), Bob chooses c from
{c, n} even though it would be g(σ∗(γA, ρB)) = n, a contradiction.
Subcase 1.4. If σ∗B(ρB) = R and σ
∗
B(γB) = R: Then, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = n = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = O
µ
A(σ
∗
B(γB)) = {c, n, s}. At (γA, ρB), Ann chooses n from
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{c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be U . But, at (γA, γB), Ann chooses c and s from
{c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be either M or D, a contradiction.
Case 2. If σ∗A(ρA) = M : Then, O
µ
B(σ
∗
A(ρA)) = {c, s}. At (ρA, ρB) and (ρA, γB), Bob
chooses s from the set {c, s}. Therefore, σ∗B(ρB) and σ∗B(γB) must both be M . Then,
OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = O
µ
A(σ
∗
B(γB)) = {c, s}. At (γA, ρB) and (γA, γB) Ann chooses c from the
set {c, s}, which implies it must be that σ∗A(ρA) = U .
Indeed the following observations imply that our second EPE is σ′′′∗ such that
σ′′′∗A (ρA) = M , σ
′′′∗
A (γA) = U , and σ
′′′∗
B (ρB) = M , σ
′′′∗
B (γB) = M
At (ρA, ρB) : s ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(ρA, ρB)) ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A (OµA(σ′′′∗B (ρB))),
s ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(ρA, ρB)) ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B (OµB(σ′′′∗A (ρA))).
At (ρA, γB) : s ∈ C(ρA,γB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(ρA, γB)) ∈ C(ρA,γB)A (OµA(σ′′′∗B (γB))),
s ∈ C(ρA,γB)B ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(ρA, γB)) ∈ C(ρA,γB)B (OµB(σ′′′∗A (ρA))).
At (γA, ρB) : c ∈ C(γA,ρB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(γA, ρB)) ∈ C(γA,ρB)A (OµA(σ′′′∗B (ρB))),
c ∈ C(γA,ρB)B ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(γA, ρB)) ∈ C(γA,ρB)B (OµB(σ′′′∗A (γA))).
At (γA, γB) : c ∈ C(γA,γB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(γA, γB)) ∈ C(γA,γB)A (OµA(σ′′′∗B (γB))),
c ∈ C(γA,γB)B ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(γA, γB)) ∈ C(γA,γB)B (OµB(σ′′′∗A (γA))).
Case 3. If σ∗A(ρA) = D: Then, O
µ
B(σ
∗
A(ρA)) = {n, s}. At (ρA, ρB) and (ρA, γB), Bob
chooses s from the set {n, s}. Therefore, σ∗B(ρB) and σ∗B(γB) must be either M or R.
Subcase 3.1. If σ∗B(ρB) = M and σ
∗
B(γB) = M : So, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = s = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = O
µ
A(σ
∗
B(γB)) = {c, s}. At (γA, ρB) and (γA, γB), Ann chooses c
from {c, s}, which implies it must be σ∗A(γA) = U .
Indeed the following observations imply that our third EPE is σ′′∗ such that σ′′∗A (ρA) =
D, σ′′∗A (γA) = U , and σ
′′∗
B (ρB) = M , σ
′′∗
B (γB) = M .
At (ρA, ρB) : s ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′′∗(ρA, ρB)) ∈ C(ρA,ρB)A (OµA(σ′′∗B (ρB))),
s ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B ({n, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(ρA, ρB)) ∈ C(ρA,ρB)B (OµB(σ′′∗A (ρA))).
At (ρA, γB) : s ∈ C(ρA,γB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(ρA, γB)) ∈ C(ρA,γB)A (OµA(σ′′∗B (γB))),
s ∈ C(ρA,γB)B ({n, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(ρA, γB)) ∈ C(ρA,γB)B (OµB(σ′′∗A (ρA))).
At (γA, ρB) : c ∈ C(γA,ρB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(γA, ρB)) ∈ C(γA,ρB)A (OµA(σ′′∗B (ρB))),
c ∈ C(γA,ρB)B ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(γA, ρB)) ∈ C(γA,ρB)B (OµB(σ′′∗A (γA))).
At (γA, γB) : c ∈ C(γA,γB)A ({c, s}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(γA, γB)) ∈ C(γA,γB)A (OµA(σ′′∗B (γB))),
c ∈ C(γA,γB)B ({c, n}) =⇒ g(σ′′∗(γA, γB)) ∈ C(γA,γB)B (OµB(σ′′∗A (γA))).
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Subcase 3.2. If σ∗B(ρB) = M and σ
∗
B(γB) = R: So, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = s = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = {c, s} and OµA(σ∗B(γB)) = {c, n, s}. At (γA, ρB), Ann chooses
c from {c, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be U . On the other hand, at (γA, γB), Ann
chooses c and s from {c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be M or D, a contradiction.
Subcase 3.3. If σ∗B(ρB) = R and σ
∗
B(γB) = M : So, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = s = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = {c, n, s} and OµA(σ∗B(γB)) = {c, s}. At (γA, ρB), Ann chooses n
from {c, n, s}, and at (γA, γB), Ann chooses c from {c, n}. They both imply we must
have σ∗A(γA) = U . Thus, O
µ
B(σ
∗
A(γA)) = {c, n}. But, at (γA, ρB), Bob chooses c from
{c, n} even though it would be g(σ∗(γA, ρB)) = n, a contradiction.
Subcase 3.4. If σ∗B(ρB) = R and σ
∗
B(γB) = R: So, g(σ
∗(ρA, ρB)) = s = g(σ∗(ρA, γB)).
We have OµA(σ
∗
B(ρB)) = O
µ
A(σ
∗
B(γB)) = {c, n, s}. At (γA, ρB), Ann chooses n from
{c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be U . On the other hand, at (γA, γB), Ann chooses
c, s from {c, n, s}, which implies σ∗A(γA) must be M or D, a contradiction.
Therefore, there are exactly three EPE of the mechanism µ = (M, g), σ′∗, σ′′∗, and
σ′′′∗, as identified above where g(σ′′∗(θ)) = g(σ′′′∗(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ: g(σ′′∗(ρA, ρB)) =
g((D,M)) = g((M,M)) = s = g(σ′′′∗(ρA, ρB)); g(σ′′∗(ρA, γB)) = g((D,M)) = g((M,M))
= s = g(σ′′′∗(ρA, γB)); g(σ′′∗(γA, ρB)) = g((U,M)) = c = g(σ′′′∗(γA, ρB)); and g(σ′′∗(γA, γB))
= g((U,M)) = c = g(σ′′′∗(γA, γB)).
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Let µ = (M, g) be a mechanism that ex-post implements the SCS F ∈ F . Consider
any SCF f ∈ F . By (i) of Definition 2, there exists an EPE σf of µ such that f = g ◦σf .
By definition of EPE, we have for each θ ∈ Θ, g(σf (θ)) is in Cθi (Oµi (σf−i(θ−i))) for
all i ∈ N . Therefore, for each θ ∈ Θ, f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Oµi (σf−i(θ−i))) for all i ∈ N . Setting
Si(f, θ−i) := O
µ
i (σ
f
−i(θ−i)), we get for each θ ∈ Θ, f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, θ−i)) for all i ∈ N .
Since f ∈ F is arbitrary, this means for each f ∈ F , i ∈ N , θ−i ∈ Θ−i, there exists
Si(f, θ−i) ⊂ X such that f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, θ−i)) as long as θ is compatible with θ−i, i.e.,
θ = (θ′i, θ−i) for some θ
′
i ∈ Θi. Therefore, f(θ′i, θ−i) ∈ C(θ
′
i,θ−i)
i (Si(f, θ−i)) for each θ
′
i ∈ Θi
holds for every set in the collection {Si(f, θ−i)|f ∈ F, i ∈ N, θ−i ∈ Θ−i}.
On the other hand, if a deception profile α is such that f ◦α /∈ F , σf ◦α cannot be an
EPE of µ = (M, g). Otherwise, by (ii) of Definition 2, there exists f˜ ∈ F with f˜ = g◦σf◦
α. But, since f = g ◦σf , we have f˜ = f ◦α ∈ F , a contradiction. Therefore, there exists
θ∗ ∈ Θ, i∗ ∈ N such that g(σf (α(θ∗))) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Oµi∗(σf−i∗(α−i∗(θ−i∗)))). Since g◦σf = f and
Oµi∗(σ
f
−i∗(α−i∗(θ−i∗))) = Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ−i∗)), we get f(α(θ
∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ−i∗))).
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B.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Let F be ex-post implementable by µ = (M, g). For any f ∈ F , set Si(f, θj) :=
Oµi (σ
f
j (θj)) for i 6= j, where σf is the EPE of µ such that f = g ◦ σf , which exists by
(i) of ex-post implementability (see Definition 2). It is also easy to see that (i) and (ii)
follows from (i) of consistency (see Definition 3) and Theorem 1; (iv) follows from (ii)
of consistency and Theorem 1. The only new condition that requires a proof is (iii).
Take any f, f ′ ∈ F , if f = f ′, then, by (i) and (ii), f(θ1, θ2) = f ′(θ1, θ2) ∈ S1(f, θ2)∩
S2(f
′, θ1) for each θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2. Suppose f 6= f ′. Recall that S1(f, θ2) :=
O1(σ
f
2 (θ2)) and S2(f
′, θ1) := O2(σ
f ′
1 (θ1)) where σ
f and σf
′
are some EPE of µ such
that f = g ◦ σf and f ′ = g ◦ σf ′ . Consider any θ1 ∈ Θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ2 and let m′1 =
σf
′
1 (θ1), m
′
2 = σ
f (θ2). Then, it follows from S1(f, θ2) and S2(f
′, θ1) being opportunity
sets as defined above that g(m′1,m
′
2) = g(m
′
1, σ
f
2 (θ2)) ∈ S1(f, θ2) and g(m′1,m′2) =
g(σf
′
1 (θ1),m
′
2) ∈ S2(f ′, θ1). Therefore, we must have g(m′1,m′2) = g(σf
′
1 (θ1), σ
f
2 (θ2)) ∈
S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ1).
B.4 Proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 and Lemma 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Let S be a non-empty collection of sets consistent with an SCS
F under incomplete information and let S∗ := Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ−i∗)) ∈ S. Then, condition (i)
of ex-post choice monotonicity follows from condition (ii) of Definition 3 while condition
(ii) of ex-post choice monotonicity follows from (i) of Definition 3.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let S be a non-empty collection of sets consistent with an SCS
F under incomplete information and take any f ∈ F , θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N and let S :=
Si(f, θ−i) ∈ S. By (i) of Definition 3, f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, θ−i)) implies f(θ) ∈ Cθi (S)
establishing condition (i) of quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatibility. Furthermore,
since f(θ′i, θ−i) ∈ C(θ
′
i,θ−i)
i (Si(f, θ−i)) for each θ
′
i ∈ Θi due to (i) of Definition 3, we
have f(θ′i, θ−i) ∈ S for each θ′i ∈ Θi establishing condition (ii) of quasi-ex-post choice
incentive compatibility.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof directly follows from the fact that whenever f is partially
truthfully (ex-post) implemented by the direct mechanism gd : Θ→ X, the opportunity
set of any individual i ∈ N under truthtelling is {f(θ′i, θ−i)|θ′i ∈ Θi}, i.e., Og
d
i (θ−i) =
{f(θ′i, θ−i)|θ′i ∈ Θi}.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose the individual choices satisfy the IIA and let f be par-
tially (ex-post) implemented by the mechanism µ. Then, Theorem 1 together with
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Proposition 2 implies that f is quasi-ex-post choice incentive compatible. That is, for ev-
ery θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N there exists S ∈ X such that f(θ) ∈ Cθi (S) and {f(θ′i, θ−i)|θ′i ∈ Θi} ⊆ S.
Hence, by the IIA, we must have f(θ) ∈ Cθi ({f(θ′i, θ−i)|θ′i ∈ Θi}). Therefore, by Lemma
1, the revelation principle holds.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 3
The proof is provided as a discussion right after Theorem 3.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 4
Consider the mechanism µ = (M, g) described in Section A.1.
First, we show that for any f ∈ F , there exists an EPE, σf , of the mechanism
µ = (M, g) such that f = g ◦ σf , i.e., (i) of ex-post implementation (see Definition 2)
holds: Take any f ∈ F , let σf1 (θ1) = (f, θ1) and σf2 (θ2) = (f, θ2). Then, by Rule 1,
g(σf (θ)) = f(θ1, θ2) for each θ ∈ Θ, i.e., f = g ◦ σf .
Below, we first show that Oi(σ
f
j (θj)) = Si(f, θj) at each θ ∈ Θ for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with
i 6= j. Without loss of generality, it is enough to show that O1(σf2 (θ2)) = S1(f, θ2).
Recall that, by definition, O1(σ
f
2 (θ2)) := {g(m1, (f, θ2))|m1 ∈ F ×Θ1}. Since S1(f, θ2) =
R(f, θ2)∪ Irr(f, θ2), we first show that R(f, θ2) and Irr(f, θ2) are subsets of O1(σf2 (θ2)).
By Rule 1, if m1 = (f, θ
′
1) for some θ
′
1 ∈ Θ1, then the outcome is f(θ′1, θ2). Therefore,
R(f, θ2) = {f(θ′1, θ2)|θ′1 ∈ Θ1} ⊆ O1(σf2 (θ2)).
Next, consider any irrelevant alternative x ∈ Irr(f, θ2). Either, by (iii.1), there is
an f ′ ∈ F with f ′ 6= f and θ′1 ∈ Θ′1 such that S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ′1) = {x} or, by (iii.2),
there is an f ′ ∈ F with f ′ 6= f and θ′1 ∈ Θ′1 such that Irr(f ′, θ′1) = {x} or, by (iii.3),
Irr(f, θ2) = {x} and Irr(f ′, θ′1) = ∅. In all three cases, by Rule 3, individual 1 can
obtain x by simply sending the message m′1 = (f
(x,f,θ2), θ
(x,f,θ2)
1 ) ∈ T1(x, f, θ2) in our
mechanism. Hence, Irr(f, θ2) ⊆ O1(σf2 (θ2)) as well.
On the other hand, in order to see that O1(σ
f
2 (θ2)) ⊆ S1(f, θ2), notice that unilateral
deviations of the first individual sustain alternatives in R(f, θ2) by Rule 1, while any
irrelevant alternative in Irr(f, θ2) can be obtained due to Rule 3. By Rule 2, the only
other type of deviation that individual 1 can perform involves sending a message of the
form m′1 = (f
′, θ′1) with f
′ 6= f resulting in x˜(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2), which is also in S1(f, θ2)—as
it is in S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ′1). Thus, O1(σf2 (θ2)) = S1(f, θ2).
Furthermore, by (i) and (ii) of two-individual consistency, for each θ ∈ Θ, we have
f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, θj)) for both i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j. As Oi(σfj (θj)) = Si(f, θj) for both
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i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j and g◦σf = f , we have, for each θ ∈ Θ, g(σf (θ)) ∈ Cθi (Oi(σfj (θj)))
for both i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j. That is, σf is an EPE of the mechanism µ = (M, g).
Now, we show that for any EPE σ∗ of µ, Rule 1 must apply at each θ ∈ Θ: Let σ∗ be
an EPE of µ denoted as σ∗i (θi) = (fi(θi), αi(θi)), i ∈ {1, 2}. Suppose Rule 2 applies at θ ∈
Θ, then the outcome would be g(σ∗(θ)) = x˜(f1(θ1), f2(θ2), α1(θ1), α2(θ2)). By construc-
tion, x˜(f1(θ1), f2(θ2), α1(θ1), α2(θ2)) /∈ C θ˜1(S1(f2(θ2), α2(θ2)))∩C θ˜2(S2(f1(θ1), α1(θ1))) for
any θ˜ ∈ Θ. But, as O2(σ∗1(θ1)) = S2(f1(θ1), α1(θ1)) and O1(σ∗2(θ2)) = S1(f2(θ2), α2(θ2)),
g(σ∗(θ)) /∈ C θ˜1(O1(σ∗2(θ2))) ∩ C θ˜2(O2(σ∗1(θ1))) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ, a contradiction to σ∗ being
an EPE of µ. On the other hand, if Rule 3 applies at θ, then, by construction, g(σ∗(θ)) is
either in Irr(f1(θ1), α1(θ1)) or Irr(f2(θ2), α2(θ2)). Then, by condition (iii) of Theorem
4, we have g(σ∗(θ)) /∈ C θ˜1(S1(f2(θ2), α2(θ2)))∩C θ˜2(S2(f1(θ1), α1(θ1))) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ. But,
since O2(σ
∗
1(θ1)) = S2(f1(θ1), α1(θ1)) and O1(σ
∗
2(θ2)) = S1(f2(θ2), α2(θ2)) this also leads
to a contradiction of σ∗ being an EPE of µ.
Therefore, under any EPE σ∗ of µ, Rule 1 must apply at every θ ∈ Θ.
Now, let σ∗ be an arbitrary EPE of mechanism µ represented by σ∗(θi) = (fi(θi), αi(θi)).
Since Rule 1 applies at every θ ∈ Θ under σ∗, there must exist a unique f¯ ∈ F such
that f1(θ1) = f2(θ2) = f¯ for every θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2. To see why, suppose that for
an arbitrary θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ, as Rule 1 must apply at θ under σ∗, f1(θ1) = f2(θ2) = f¯
but there also exists i0 ∈ {1, 2} and θi0 ∈ Θi0 such that fi0(θi0) 6= f¯ . Without loss of
generality, suppose it is individual 1 type θˆ1 ∈ Θ1 for whom we have f1(θˆ1) 6= f¯ . But,
then, Rule 1 cannot apply at (θˆ1, θ2) ∈ Θ, as f1(θˆ1) 6= f¯ and f2(θ2) = f¯ , a contradiction
to Rule 1 applying at all θ ∈ Θ under the EPE σ∗.
Since there is a unique f¯ ∈ F such that fi(θi) = f¯ for each θi ∈ Θi and i ∈ {1, 2},
by Rule 1, g(σ∗(θ)) = f¯(α(θ)) for each θ ∈ Θ. That is, g ◦ σ∗ = f¯ ◦ α.
Finally we show that, f¯ ◦ α ∈ F where each individual i ∈ {1, 2} reports his/her
type as αi(θi) ∈ Θi as part of their messages under σ∗: Since Rule 1 applies at θ,
by construction, we have Oµi (σ
∗
j (αj(θj))) = Si(f¯, αj(θj)) for each i ∈ {1, 2}. If f¯ ◦
α /∈ F , then by (iv) of two-individual consistency, there exists θ∗ ∈ Θ, such that
either f¯(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f¯, α2(θ∗2))) or f¯(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f¯, α1(θ∗1))). Since Rule 1
applies at θ∗ as well, g(σ∗(θ∗)) = f¯(α(θ∗)). Therefore, f¯(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f¯, α2(θ∗2)))
implies g(σ∗(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (Oµ1 (σ∗2(θ∗2))) while f¯(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f¯, α1(θ∗1))) implies that
g(σ∗(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (Oµ2 (σ∗1(θ∗1))). Both cases lead to a contradiction to σ∗ being an EPE of
µ. Hence, we must have f¯ ◦α ∈ F . Thus, for any EPE σ∗ of µ, there exists f ≡ f¯ ◦α ∈ F
with g ◦ σ∗ = f , i.e., (ii) of ex-post implementation holds as well.
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B.7 Proof of Theorem 5
Consider the mechanism µ = (M, g) constructed in Section A.2.
First, we show that for any f ∈ F , there exists an EPE, σf , of the mechanism
µ = (M, g) such that f = g ◦ σf , which implies condition (i) of ex-post implementation
(see Definition 2): Take any f ∈ F , let σfi (θi) = (0, f, θi, xi, 0) for both i ∈ {1, 2} with
arbitrary xi ∈ X¯ for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Then, Rule 1 applies at each θ under σf . Hence,
we have g(σf (θ)) = f(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ, i.e., f = g ◦ σf . Below, we show that for each
i ∈ {1, 2}, Oi(σfj (θj)) = Si(f, θj) at each θ ∈ Θ with i 6= j.
Without loss of generality, we can focus on individual 1. Observe that f(θ) ∈ S1(f, θ2)
since, by (i) of two-individual consistency, f(θ) ∈ Cθ1(S1(f, θ2)). That is, if a unilateral
deviation by individual 1 does not change the outcome at θ, the outcome is already in
(S1(f, θ2)). On the other hand, if a unilateral deviation by individual 1 changes the
outcome at θ, then either Rule 1 or Rule 2.1 or Rule 3 applies at θ, i.e., Rule 2.2 and
Rule 4 cannot be attained by a unilateral deviation of individual 1 at any θ since the first
entry of individual 2’s message is 0 at any θ under σf . Therefore, at any θ ∈ Θ, by Rule
2.1, individual 1 can attain any outcome x ∈ S1(f, θ2) by simply changing his message
to (1, f, θ1, x, 0). Therefore, S1(f, θ2) ⊂ O1(σf2 (θ2)) for each θ ∈ Θ. To see that, at any
θ ∈ Θ, individual 1 cannot obtain any other alternative by a unilateral deviation, i.e.,
O1(σ
f
2 (θ2)) ⊂ S1(f, θ2) as well: observe that if Rule 1 continues to apply the outcome
at θ is f(θ′1, θ2) for some θ
′
1 ∈ Θ1 and f(θ′1, θ2) ∈ S1(f, θ2) as, by (i) of two-individual
consistency, f(θ′1, θ2) ∈ C(θ
′
1,θ2)
1 (S1(f, θ2)); when the otherwise part of Rule 2.1 implies,
x¯(1, f, θ2) ∈ S1(f, θ2); and when Rule 3 applies, x¯(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2) ∈ S1(f, θ2) for each f ′ ∈ F ,
θ′1 ∈ Θ1 as well because, by construction, x¯(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2) ∈ S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ′1), a non-
empty set due to (iii) of two-individual consistency. That is, the mechanism is designed
such that, under σf , at any θ, by a unilateral deviation, individual 1 can obtain every
alternative in S1(f, θ2) and nothing else. Due to symmetry, the same line of proof
applies to individual 2 as well. That is, for each θ ∈ Θ, Oi(σfj (θj)) = Si(f, θj) for both
i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j.
Since, by (i) and (ii) of two-individual consistency, for both i ∈ {1, 2} and for each
θ ∈ Θ we have f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, θj)), we have, for each θ ∈ Θ, g(σf (θ)) ∈ Cθi (Oµi (σfj (θj)))
for both i ∈ {1, 2}. That is, σf is an EPE of µ such that f = g ◦ σf , as desired.
Next, we show that for any EPE σ∗ of µ, Rule 1 must apply at each θ ∈ Θ. Below,
we show that other rules are ruled out one by one:
Let σ∗ be an EPE of µ denoted as σ∗i (θi) = (ni(θi), fi(θi), αi(θi), xi(θi), ki(θi)), i ∈
{1, 2}. First, consider Rule 2.1 and Rule 2.2; if Rule 2.1 or Rule 2.2 applies at θ, then
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the opportunity set of individual i, whose message’s first entry is 1, equals Si(f, αj(θj)),
where αj(θj) denotes the reported type of j at θ and fj(θj) = f . On the other hand, the
opportunity set of individual j, whose message’s first entry is 0, is X¯. Hence, if Rule 2.1
or Rule 2.2 applies at θ under σ∗, g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (S) for some S = Si(f, αj(θj)) ∈ Si and
g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθj (X¯). This violates (ii) of choice incompatibility at θ.
Next, let us deal with Rule 3: If Rule 3 applies at θ, the opportunity sets of in-
dividuals i and j are of the form Si(f, αj(θj)) and Sj(f
′, αi(θi)), where f ′ = fi(θi)
and f = fj(θj) are the reported SCFs such that f 6= f ′; αi(θi) and αj(θj) are the
reported types at θ in the messages of i and j, respectively. This is due to the follow-
ing: When Rule 3 applies, g(σ∗(θ)) = x¯(f ′, f, α1(θ1), α2(θ2)) which is in Si(f, αj(θj)) ∩
Sj(f
′, αi(θi)) due to (iii) of two-individual consistency. When individual i deviates to
(1, fi(θi), αi(θi), x˜, ki(θi)) with x˜ ∈ Si(f, αj(θj)), either Rule 2.1 or Rule 2.2 applies and
the outcome is x˜. Thus, Si(f, αj(θj)) ⊂ Oµi (σ∗j (θj)). On the other hand, a deviation
of the form (1, fi(θi), αi(θi), xˆ, ki(θi)) with xˆ /∈ Si(f, αj(θj)) implies that either Rule 2.1
or Rule 2.2 applies and the outcome is x¯(i, f, αj(θj)) ∈ Si(f, αj(θj)), by construction.
The only possible deviation that leads to another outcome consists of (0, f, θ˜i, ·, ·). But
then, Rule 1 applies and the outcome equals f(θ˜i, αj(θj)) which is again in Si(f, αj(θj))
due to either (i) or (ii) of two-individual consistency. Hence, Oµi (σ
∗
j (θj)) = Si(f, αj(θj)).
Thus, if Rule 3 applies at some θ under σ∗, we must have g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, αj(θj)))
and g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθj (Sj(f ′, αi(θi))) with f 6= f ′. But this violates (iii) of choice incom-
patibility at θ.
Finally, whenever Rule 4 applies, the opportunity sets of individual 1 and individual
2 under our mechanism are equal to X¯. Hence, if Rule 4 applies at some θ under σ∗,
then we must have g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (X¯) for both i ∈ {1, 2}. But this violates (i) of choice
incompatibility at θ.
Therefore, under any EPE σ∗ of µ, Rule 1 must apply at every θ ∈ Θ.
Now, let σ∗ be an arbitrary EPE of mechanism µ represented by σ∗(θi) = (ni(θi),
fi(θi), αi(θi), xi(θi), ki(θi)). Since Rule 1 applies at every θ ∈ Θ under σ∗, there must
exist a unique f¯ ∈ F such that f1(θ1) = f2(θ2) = f¯ for every θ1 ∈ Θ1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2.
To see why, suppose that for an arbitrary θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ, as Rule 1 must apply at θ
under σ∗, f1(θ1) = f2(θ2) = f¯ but there also exists i0 ∈ {1, 2} and θi0 ∈ Θi0 such that
fi0(θi0) 6= f¯ . Without loss of generality, suppose it is individual 1 type θˆ1 ∈ Θ1 for whom
we have f1(θˆ1) 6= f¯ . But, then, Rule 1 cannot apply at (θˆ1, θ2) ∈ Θ, as f1(θˆ1) 6= f¯ and
f2(θ2) = f¯ , a contradiction to Rule 1 applying at all θ ∈ Θ under the EPE σ∗.
Since there is a unique f¯ ∈ F such that fi(θi) = f¯ for each θi ∈ Θi and i ∈ {1, 2},
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by Rule 1, g(σ∗(θ)) = f¯(α(θ)) for each θ ∈ Θ. That is, g ◦ σ∗ = f¯ ◦ α.
Furthermore, it must be that f¯ ◦ α ∈ F where α is the deception profile specified by
the EPE σ∗. To see why, observe that at any θ ∈ Θ, each individual i ∈ {1, 2} reports
his/her type as αi(θi) ∈ Θi as part of their messages under σ∗. Since Rule 1 applies
at θ, by construction, we have Oµi (σ
∗
j (αj(θj))) = Si(f¯, αj(θj)) for each i ∈ {1, 2}. If
f¯ ◦α /∈ F , then by (iv) of two-individual consistency, there exists θ∗ ∈ Θ, such that either
f¯(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f¯, α2(θ∗2))) or f¯(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f¯, α1(θ∗1))). Since Rule 1 applies at
θ∗ as well, we have g(σ∗(θ∗)) = f¯(α(θ∗)). Therefore, f¯(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f¯, α2(θ∗2)))
implies g(σ∗(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (Oµ1 (σ∗2(θ∗2))) while f¯(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f¯, α1(θ∗1))) implies that
g(σ∗(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (Oµ2 (σ∗1(θ∗1))). Both induce a contradiction to σ∗ being an EPE of µ.
Hence, we must have f¯◦α ∈ F . Therefore, for any EPE σ∗ of µ, there exists f ≡ f¯◦α ∈ F
with g ◦ σ∗ = f , i.e., (ii) of ex-post implementation holds as well.
B.8 Proof of Theorem 6
Consider the mechanism µ = (M, g) constructed in Section A.2.
As shown in the proof of Theorem 5, for any f ∈ F , σfi (θi) = (0, f, θi, xi, 0) for both
i ∈ {1, 2} (with arbitrary xi ∈ X¯) is an EPE of µ such that f = g ◦ σf . That is, for any
f ∈ F , there exists an EPE, σf , of µ such that f = g ◦ σf , which implies that condition
(i) of Definition 2 (ex-post implementability) holds.
Consider an EPE σ∗ of µ represented by σ∗(θi) = (ni(θi), fi(θi), αi(θi), xi(θi), ki(θi)).
For any f ∈ F and i ∈ N , let Θ¯fi := {θi ∈ Θi|ni(θ) = 0, fi(θi) = f} for i ∈ {1, 2}. That
is, Θ¯fi ⊂ Θ¯i is the set of types of individual i ∈ {1, 2} where the first entry of his/her
message—his/her proposed SCF—is f under σ∗. Let Θ¯f := ×i∈NΘ¯fi . That is, Θ¯f is
the set of states where both individuals propose the SCF f ∈ F under σ∗. Consider
the collection of product sets {Θ¯f}f∈F . Observe that Θ¯ :=
⋃
f∈F Θ¯f is the set of states
where Rule 1 applies under σ∗.
Hence, at any θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯, either one of Rule 2.1, Rule 2.2, Rule 3 or Rule 4 applies
under σ∗. For each of these rules, consider the corresponding opportunity sets under µ:
If Rule 2.1 or Rule 2.2 applies at θ, then the opportunity set of the individual i, whose
message’s first entry is 1, equals Si(f, αj(θj)), where αj(θj) denotes the reported type of
j at θ, while the opportunity set of the individual j, whose message’s first entry is 0, is
X¯, i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Thus, if Rule 2.1 or Rule 2.2 applies at θ under σ∗, we must
have g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (T ) for some T = Si(f, αj(θj)) ∈ Si and g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθj (X¯). By (iv)
of consistency-unanimity, there exists f ∗ ∈ F with T ∈ Si such that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ)
whenever Rule 2.1 or Rule 2.2 applies at θ.
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If Rule 3 applies at θ, then, as was shown in the proof of Theorem 5, the opportunity
sets of individuals i and j are Si(f, αj(θj)) and Sj(f
′, αi(θi)), where f ′ ∈ F and f ∈ F
with f 6= f ′ are reported SCFs and αi(θi) and αj(θj) are the reported types at θ in the
messages of i and j, respectively, i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Thus, if Rule 3 applies at some θ
under σ∗, we must have g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, αj(θj))) and g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθj (Sj(f ′, αi(θi))).
Thus, by (iv) of consistency-unanimity, there exists f ∗ ∈ F such that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ)
when Rule 3 applies at θ.
Finally, whenever Rule 4 applies at θ, the opportunity sets of individuals 1 and 2
under our mechanism are both equal to X¯. Therefore, if Rule 4 applies at θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯
under σ∗, then g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (X¯) for both i ∈ {1, 2}. By (iv) of consistency-unanimity,
there exists f ∗ ∈ F such that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ) whenever Rule 4 applies at θ as well.
To sum up, there exists f ∗ ⊂ F such that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ) for every θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯.
Next, we show that it must also be that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ¯. Recall that
σ∗(θi) = (ni(θi), fi(θi), αi(θi), xi(θi), ki(θi)), i ∈ {1, 2}: Suppose, for contradiction, that
there exists θ˜ ∈ Θ¯f for some f ∈ F such that g(σ∗(θ˜)) 6= f ∗(θ˜). Since Rule 1 applies
at θ˜ under σ∗ and, hence, g(σ∗(θ˜)) = f(α(θ˜)), we have f(α(θ˜)) 6= f ∗(θ˜) where α is the
deception profile induced by σ∗. Therefore, by (v) of consistency-unanimity, there exists
θ∗ ∈ Θ¯f such that either f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (S1(f, α2(θ∗2))) or f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (S2(f, α1(θ∗1))).
Since θ∗ ∈ Θ¯f , we have fi(θ∗i ) = f for both i ∈ {1, 2}. That is, Rule 1 applies at
θ∗ and hence g(σ∗(θ∗)) = f(α(θ∗)). But then, as shown in the proof of Theorem
5, Oµ1 (σ
∗
2(θ
∗
2)) = S1(f, α2(θ
∗
2)) and O
µ
2 (σ
∗
1(θ
∗
1)) = S2(f, α1(θ
∗
1)). Therefore, f(α(θ
∗)) /∈
Cθ
∗
1 (O
µ
1 (σ
∗
2(θ
∗
2))) implies g(σ
∗(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗1 (Oµ1 (σ∗2(θ∗2))) while f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (Oµ2 (σ∗1(θ∗1)))
implies g(σ∗(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗2 (Oµ2 (σ∗1(θ∗1))). In both cases, σ∗ cannot be an EPE of µ, a
contradiction.
Therefore, g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ with f ∗ ∈ F . That is, condition (ii)
ex-post implementability (see Definition 2) holds as well.
B.9 Proof of Theorem 7
Consider the mechanism µ = (M, g) constructed in Section A.3.
First, we show that for any f ∈ F , there exists an EPE, σf , of µ = (M, g) such that
f = g ◦ σf . This implies that condition (i) of ex-post implementability (see Definition
2) holds: Take any f ∈ F , let σfi (θi) = (f, θi, x, 1) for each i ∈ N and for some arbitrary
x ∈ X¯. By Rule 1, we have g(σf (θ)) = f(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ, i.e., f = g◦σf . Observe that
for any unilateral deviation by individual i from σf , either Rule 1 or Rule 2 applies, i.e.,
Rule 3 is not attainable by any unilateral deviation from σf . If individual i deviates to
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mi = (f, θi, x
′, n′) when his/her type is θi, then Rule 1 continues to apply at θ and the
outcome continues to be f(θ), which is in Si(f, θ−i) since, by condition (i) of consistency,
f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, θ−i)). If individual i deviates to mi = (f, θ′i, x′, n′) with θ′i 6= θi when
his/her type is θi, then Rule 1 continues to apply at θ and the outcome at θ becomes
f(θ′i, θ−i), which is in Si(f, θ−i) as well since f(θ
′
i, θ−i) ∈ C(θ
′
i,θ−i)
i (Si(f, θ−i)), again by
condition (i) of consistency. If individual i deviates to mi = (f
′, θ′i, x
′, n′) with f ′ 6= f
when his/her type is θi, then Rule 2 applies at θ and the outcome at θ becomes x
′ if
x′ is in Si(f, θ−i), and otherwise x¯(i, f, θ−i), which is already in Si(f, θ−i) as well. This
means, as Si(f, θ−i) ⊂ X¯ for each θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N , under σf , at any θ ∈ Θ, by unilateral
deviations, individual i can generate every alternative in Si(f, θ−i) and nothing else.
That is, by construction, Oµi (σ
f
−i(θ−i)) = Si(f, θ−i) for each θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N . Since,
by (i) of consistency, f(θ) ∈ Cθi (Si(f, θ−i)) for each i ∈ N , we have for each θ ∈ Θ,
g(σf (θ)) ∈ Cθi (Oµi (σf−i(θ−i))) for all i ∈ N , i.e., σf is an EPE of µ such that f = g ◦ σf .
Consider now any EPE σ∗ of µ denoted as σ∗i (θi) = (fi(θi), αi(θi), xi(θi), ki(θi)) for
each i ∈ N . That is, fi(θi) denotes the SCF proposed by individual i when his/her
type is θi; αi(θi) denotes the reported type of individual i when his/her type is θi; xi(θi)
denotes the alternative proposed by individual i when his/her type is θi; and ki(θi)
denotes the number proposed by individual i when his/her type is θi.
Next, we show that, under any EPE σ∗ of µ, Rule 1 must apply at each θ ∈ Θ:
Suppose, for contradiction, that either Rule 2 or Rule 3 applies at some θ˜ ∈ Θ under
σ∗. If Rule 2 applies at θ˜, by construction, we have Oµj (σ
∗
−j(θ˜−j)) = Sj(f, αj(θ˜−j)) for
the odd-man-out j ∈ N and Oµi (σ∗−i(θ˜−i)) = X¯ for all i 6= j, i.e., for all the other
n − 1 individuals. On the other hand, if Rule 3 applies at θ˜, we have, by construction,
Oµi (σ
∗
−i(θ˜−i)) = X¯ for all i ∈ N . Therefore, under both Rule 2 and Rule 3, at least
n − 1 individuals have the opportunity set X¯. Since σ∗ is an EPE of µ, it follows that
g(σ∗(θ˜)) ∈ Cθi (X¯) for at least n−1 individuals. This contradicts the choice incompatible
pair property of X¯ at θ˜. So, under any EPE σ∗ of µ, Rule 1 must apply at each θ ∈ Θ.
Moreover, under any EPE σ∗ of µ, there is a unique f ∈ F such that fi(θi) = f for all
i ∈ N and for all θi ∈ Θi. To see why, fix an EPE σ∗ of µ, pick an arbitrary θ ∈ Θ, and
as Rule 1 must apply at θ ∈ Θ under σ∗, let fi(θi) = f for all i ∈ N under σ∗. Suppose,
for contradiction, that there exists i0 ∈ N , θi0 ∈ Θi0 such that fi0(θi0) 6= f . Without
loss of generality, suppose i0 = 1 and θˆ1 ∈ Θ1 such that f1(θˆ1) 6= f . But, then, under
the EPE σ∗, Rule 1 cannot apply at state (θˆ1, θ−1) ∈ Θ, as f1(θˆ1) 6= f and fj(θj) = f
for all j 6= 1 under σ∗, a contradiction.
Therefore, for any EPE σ∗ of µ, there exists a unique f ∈ F such that fi(θi) = f
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for all i ∈ N and for all θi ∈ Θi. Hence, by Rule 1, g(σ∗(θ)) = f(α(θ)) for each θ ∈ Θ.
That is, g ◦ σ∗ = f ◦ α.
Finally, we show that it must be that f ◦α ∈ F : Since Rule 1 applies at each θ ∈ Θ,
and each i ∈ N reports the type αi(θi) ∈ Θi as the second entry of their messages at
θ ∈ Θ under σ∗, by construction, we have, at each θ ∈ Θ, Oµi (σ∗−i(θ−i)) = Si(f, α−i(θ−i))
for all i ∈ N . If f ◦ α /∈ F , then by (ii) of consistency (see Definition 3), there
exists θ∗ ∈ Θ, i∗ ∈ N such that f(α(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ−i∗))). But this implies
g(σ∗(θ∗)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Oµi∗(σ∗−i∗(θ∗−i∗))), a contradiction to σ∗ being an EPE of µ. That is, we
must have f ◦ α ∈ F , as desired. Therefore, g ◦ σ∗ = f ◦ α ∈ F , which implies that
condition (ii) of ex-post implementability holds as well.
B.10 Proof of Theorem 8
Consider the mechanism µ = (M, g) constructed in Section A.3.
As shown in the proof of Theorem 7, for any f ∈ F , σfi (θi) = (f, θi, x, 1) for each
i ∈ N (for arbitrary x ∈ X¯) is an EPE of µ such that f = g ◦σf . That is, for any f ∈ F ,
there exists an EPE, σf , of µ such that f = g ◦ σf , which implies that condition (i) of
ex-post implementability (refer to Definition 2) holds.
Now, consider an EPE σ∗ of µ = (M, g) represented as before by σ∗(θi) = (fi(θi),
αi(θi), xi(θi), ki(θi)). For any f ∈ F and i ∈ N , let Θ¯fi := {θi ∈ Θi|fi(θi) = f}.
That is, Θ¯fi ⊂ Θ¯i is the set of types of individual i where the first entry of his/her
message—his/her proposed SCF—is f under σ∗. Let Θ¯f := ×i∈NΘ¯fi . That is, Θ¯f is the
set of states where all of the individuals propose the SCF f ∈ F under σ∗. Consider
the collection of product sets {Θ¯f}f∈F . Observe that Θ¯ :=
⋃
f∈F Θ¯f describes the set of
states where Rule 1 applies under σ∗.
Thus, at any θ ∈ Θ\ Θ¯, either Rule 2 or Rule 3 applies, which means Oµi (σ∗−i(θ−i)) =
X¯ for at least n − 1 individuals for any θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯. Furthermore, σ∗ being an EPE of
µ implies g(σ∗(θ)) ∈ Cθi (X¯) for at least n − 1 individuals. Hence, we have, by (iii) of
consistency-no-veto (see Definition 13), there exists f ∗ ∈ F such that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ)
for each θ ∈ Θ \ Θ¯.
Next, we show that it must also be that g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ¯. Suppose not,
for contradiction, then there exists θ˜ ∈ Θ¯f for some f ∈ F such that g(σ∗(θ˜)) 6= f ∗(θ˜).
Since θ˜ ∈ Θ¯f , we have fi(θ˜i) = f for all i ∈ N . Thus, Rule 1 applies at θ˜ under σ∗, and
hence g(σ∗(θ˜)) = f(α(θ˜)) where α is the deception profile induced by σ∗. This means,
as g(σ∗(θ˜)) 6= f ∗(θ˜), we have f(α(θ˜)) 6= f ∗(θ˜). Then, by (iv) of consistency-no-veto,
there exists i∗ ∈ N and θ∗ ∈ Θ¯f such that f(α(θ˜)) /∈ Cθ∗i∗ (Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ∗−i∗))). But, since
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Rule 1 applies at θ˜ under σ∗, by construction, Oµi∗(σ
∗
−i∗(θ˜−i∗)) = Si∗(f, α−i∗(θ
∗
−i∗)), which
implies g(σ∗(θ˜)) /∈ Oµi∗(σ∗−i∗(θ˜−i∗)), a contradiction to σ∗ being an EPE of µ.
Therefore, g(σ∗(θ)) = f ∗(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ. That is, condition (ii) of ex-post
implementability holds as well.
C An Application of Theorem 4
In this section, we provide an example where Theorem 4 can be utilized to ex-post
implement an SCS with the following data: The individual choices of Amy and Bill over
the set of alternatives X = {a, b, c} at state θ ∈ Θ = ΘA ×ΘB with ΘA = {θA, θ′A} and
ΘB = {θB, θ′B} are as in Table 12. On the other hand, F = {f, f ′} is as in Table 13.
One can show that SA and SB as given in Table 20 are two-individual consistent
with F under incomplete information. In what follows, we show that the collections SA
SA(f, θB) = {a, c} SA(f, θ′B) = {a, b, c} SA(f ′, θB) = {a, b, c} SA(f ′, θ′B) = {a, b}
SB(f, θA) = {a, c} SB(f, θ′A) = {a, b} SB(f ′, θA) = {a, b, c} SB(f ′, θ′A) = {b, c}
Table 20: Two-individual consistent collections for Amy and Bill.
and SB satisfy conditions (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 4 as well. To that regard, Table 21
displays the resulting relevant and irrelevant sets of alternatives. Recall that, for each
R(f, θB) = {a} R(f, θ′B) = {a, b} R(f ′, θB) = {a, b} R(f ′, θ′B) = {b}
R(f, θA) = {a} R(f, θ′A) = {a, b} R(f ′, θA) = {a, b} R(f ′, θ′A) = {b}
Irr(f, θB) = {c} Irr(f, θ′B) = {c} Irr(f ′, θB) = {c} Irr(f ′, θ′B) = {a}
Irr(f, θA) = {c} Irr(f, θ′A) = ∅ Irr(f ′, θA) = {c} Irr(f ′, θ′A) = {c}
Table 21: The relevant and irrelevant alternatives for Amy and Bill.
f ∈ F and θj ∈ Θj, R(f, θj) := {f(θ′i, θj)|θ′i ∈ Θi}, and Irr(f, θj) := Si(f, θj) \ R(f, θj),
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j.
First, we verify that condition (ii) of Theorem 4 is satisfied, i.e., for any i, j ∈ {1, 2}
with i 6= j and f, f ′ ∈ F with f 6= f ′ and θ′i ∈ Θi and θj ∈ Θj, if VS1,S2(f ′, f, θ′1, θ2) :=
(Irr(f, θ2) ∪ Irr(f ′, θ′1))
⋂
(S1(f, θ2) ∩ S2(f ′, θ′1)) = ∅, then there is x ∈ Si(f, θj) ∩
Sj(f
′, θ′i) with x /∈ C θ˜i (Si(f, θj)) ∩ C θ˜j (Sj(f ′, θ′i)) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ: It can be shown that
VSA,SB(f, f
′, θ′A, θB) = ∅ while VSA,SB(f, f ′, θA, θ′B) = VSA,SB(f, f ′, θ′A, θ′B) = {a} while for
any other case with f˜, fˆ ∈ {f, f ′} with f˜ 6= fˆ ; and θ˜A ∈ ΘA and θˆB ∈ ΘB, we have
VSA,SB(f˜, fˆ, θ˜A, θˆB) = {c}. Since VSA,SB(f, f ′, θ′A, θB) = ∅, we need to identify an alter-
native in (SA(f
′, θB) ∩ SB(f, θ′A) that is not chosen by both Amy and Bill at any state
of the world. Fortunately, we have a ∈ SA(f ′, θB) = {a, b, c} and a ∈ SB(f, θ′A) = {a, b}
and a /∈ C θ˜A({a, b, c})∩C θ˜B({a, b}) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ. So, condition (ii) of Theorem 4 holds.
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Next, we verify that condition (iii) of Theorem 4 holds, i.e., for each x ∈ Irr(f, θj),
there is Sj(f
′, θ′i) ∈ Sj such that x ∈ Sj(f ′, θ′i) and x /∈ C θ˜i (Si(f, θj)) ∩ C θ˜j (Sj(f ′, θ′i)) for
any θ˜ ∈ Θ, and either (iii.1) or (iii.2) or (iii.3) of Theorem 4 is satisfied: c ∈ Irr(f, θB) ⊂
SA(f, θB) and c ∈ SB(f ′, θ′A) with c /∈ C θ˜A({a, c}) ∩ C θ˜B({b, c}) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ, and
Irr(f ′, θ′A) = {c} implying (iii.2). c ∈ Irr(f, θ′B) ⊂ SA(f, θ′B) and c ∈ SB(f ′, θA) while
c /∈ C θ˜A({a, b, c}) ∩ C θ˜B({a, b, c}) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ, and Irr(f ′, θA) = {c}, so (iii.2) holds.
c ∈ Irr(f ′, θB) ⊂ SA(f ′, θB) and c ∈ SB(f, θA) while c /∈ C θ˜A({a, b, c}) ∩ C θ˜B({a, c}) for
any θ˜ ∈ Θ, and Irr(f, θA) = {c}, ergo (iii.2) holds. a ∈ Irr(f ′, θ′B) ⊂ SA(f ′, θ′B) and
a ∈ SB(f, θ′A) while a /∈ C θ˜A({a, b})∩C θ˜B({a, b}) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ with Irr(f ′, θB) = {a} and
Irr(f, θ′A) = ∅ implying (iii.3). a ∈ Irr(f ′, θ′B) ⊂ SA(f ′, θ′B) and a ∈ SB(f, θA) while
a /∈ C θ˜A({a, b}) ∩ C θ˜B({a, c}) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ, and SA(f ′, θ′B) ∩ SB(f, θA) = {a} implying
(iii.1). c ∈ Irr(f, θA) ⊂ SB(f, θA) and c ∈ SA(f ′, θB) while c /∈ C θ˜B({a, c})∩C θ˜A({a, b, c})
for any θ˜ ∈ Θ, and Irr(f ′, θB) = {c}, so (iii.2) holds. c ∈ Irr(f ′, θA) ⊂ SB(f ′, θA) and
c ∈ SA(f, θB) while c /∈ C θ˜B({a, b, c}) ∩ C θ˜A({a, c}) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ, and Irr(f, θB) = {c}
implying (iii.2). c ∈ Irr(f ′, θ′A) ⊂ SB(f ′, θ′A) and c ∈ SA(f, θ′B) while c /∈ C θ˜B({b, c}) ∩
C θ˜A({a, b, c}) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ, and Irr(f, θ′B) = {c} implying (iii.2).
Thus, conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of Theorem 4 hold for SA and SB given in Table
20. Consequently, the construction in Section A.1 leads to the mechanism in Table 14.
D An Application of Corollary 2
We show how Corollary 2 can be employed on an example that is inspired from
Masatlioglu and Ok (2014).
The individual choices of Ann and Bob in this section are as specified in Table 15. The
states of the world regarding the individual choices are Θ = {(♦,♦), (♦, c), (c,♦), (c, c)}.
That is, ΘA = ΘB = {♦, c}, where type ♦ stands for not having a status-quo and type
c stands for status-quo being coal. We consider a social planner who wants to ex-post
implement the SCF f described in Table 16—a selection from the BR-optimal outcomes.
In what follows, we show that the collections SA := {SA(f,♦), SA(f, c)} and SB :=
{SB(f,♦), SB(f, c)}, specified below, satisfy conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of Corollary 2.
SA(f,♦) = {n, s}, SB(f,♦) = {n, s}, SA(f, c) = {c, n, s}, SB(f, c) = {c, n, s}.
Condition (i):
For θB = ♦, we must have f(♦,♦) ∈ C(♦,♦)A (SA(f,♦)) and f(c,♦) ∈ C(c,♦)A (SA(f,♦)).
Since f(♦,♦) = s, f(c,♦) = s and s ∈ C(♦,♦)A ({n, s}), s ∈ C(c,♦)A ({n, s}), this is satisfied
for SA(f,♦) = {n, s}.
For θB = c, we must have f(♦, c) ∈ C(♦,c)A (SA(f, c)) and f(c, c) ∈ C(c,c)A (SA(f, c)).
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Since f(♦, c) = s, f(c, c) = n and s ∈ C(♦,c)A ({c, n, s}), n ∈ C(c,c)A ({c, n, s}), this is
satisfied for SA(f, c) = {c, n, s}.
For θA = ♦, we must have f(♦,♦) ∈ C(♦,♦)B (SB(f,♦)) and f(♦, c) ∈ C(♦,c)B (SB(f,♦)).
Since f(♦,♦) = s, f(♦, c) = s and s ∈ C(♦,♦)B ({n, s}), s ∈ C(♦,c)B ({n, s}), this is satisfied
for SB(f,♦) = {n, s}.
For θA = c, we must have f(c,♦) ∈ C(c,♦)B (SB(f, c)) and f(c, c) ∈ C(c,c)B (SB(f, c)).
Since f(c,♦) = s, f(c, c) = n and s ∈ C(c,♦)B ({c, n, s}), n ∈ C(c,c)B ({c, n, s}), this is
satisfied for SB(f, c) = {c, n, s}.
That is, f(θ′A, θB) ∈ C(θ
′
A,θB)
A (SA(f, θB)) for each θ
′
A ∈ {♦, c} while f(θA, θ′B) ∈
C
(θA,θ
′
B)
B (SB(f, θA)) for each θ
′
B ∈ {♦, c}, as desired.
Finally, since both n and s are in every set in the collections SA and SB we have
SA(f, θB) ∩ SB(f, θA) 6= ∅ for each θA, θB ∈ {♦, c} as well.
Therefore, condition (i) of Corollary 2 is satisfied by the collections SA and SB.
Condition (ii):
For any product set Θ¯ ⊆ Θ, we have to consider the individual choices of Ann and
Bob from X¯ and X¯; X¯ and SB(f,♦); X¯ and SB(f, c); SA(f,♦) and X¯; SA(f, c) and
X¯; SA(f,♦) and SB(f,♦); SA(f,♦) and SB(f, c); SA(f, c) and SB(f,♦); SA(f, c) and
SB(f, c) at every state of the world in Θ \ Θ¯, i.e., outside of Θ¯.
Since
⋃
S∈SA∪ SB S ⊆ X¯, we must have X¯ = {c, n, s}. Furthermore, SA(f, c) =
SB(f, c) = {c, n, s} = X¯.
Therefore, for any product set Θ¯ ⊆ Θ, it is enough to check Ann’s choices from
{c, n, s} and Bob’s from {c, n, s}; Ann’s choices from {c, n, s} and Bob’s from {n, s};
Ann’s choices from {n, s} and Bob’s from {c, n, s} at every state of the world in Θ \ Θ¯.
Below, we show that f satisfies choice unanimity whenever the individual choices
from the aforementioned sets overlap at any state of the world. This means condition
(ii) is satisfied for any subset of Θ, in particular, for any product set Θ¯ ⊆ Θ, as desired.
{c, n, s} for Ann, {c, n, s} for Bob: Ann’s and Bob’s choices overlap at (♦,♦) and
(c, c) with s ∈ C(♦,♦)A ({c, n, s})∩C(♦,♦)B ({c, n, s}) and n ∈ C(c,c)A ({c, n, s})∩C(c,c)B ({c, n, s}).
Since f(♦,♦) = s and f(c, c) = n, choice unanimity for these particular sets is satisfied
at every state of the world.
{c, n, s} for Ann, {n, s} for Bob: Ann’s and Bob’s choices overlap at (♦,♦) and (♦, c)
and (c, c) with s ∈ C(♦,♦)A ({c, n, s})∩C(♦,♦)B ({n, s}) and s ∈ C(♦,c)A ({c, n, s})∩C(♦,c)B ({n, s})
and n ∈ C(c,c)A ({c, n, s})∩C(c,c)B ({n, s}). Since f(♦,♦) = s and f(♦, c) = s and f(c, c) =
n, choice unanimity for these particular sets is also satisfied at every state of the world.
{n, s} for Ann, {c, n, s} for Bob: Ann’s and Bob’s choices overlap at (♦,♦) and (c,♦)
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and (c, c) with s ∈ C(♦,♦)A ({n, s})∩C(♦,♦)B ({c, n, s}) and s ∈ C(c,♦)A ({n, s})∩C(c,♦)B ({c, n, s})
and n ∈ C(c,c)A ({n, s})∩C(c,c)B ({c, n, s}). Since f(♦,♦) = s and f(c,♦) = s and f(c, c) =
n, choice unanimity for these particular sets is satisfied at every state as well.
Therefore, condition (ii) of Corollary 2 is also satisfied by the collections SA and SB.
Condition (iii):
For any Θ¯ ⊂ Θ, we show that if f(α(θ)) 6= f(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ¯, then θ∗ = θ ∈ Θ¯
works as the informant state by a case by case analysis:
If f(α(θ)) 6= f(θ), then (at least) one of the following must be true: (1) θ = (♦,♦) and
hence f(α(♦,♦)) 6= f(♦,♦); (2) θ = (♦, c) and hence f(α(♦, c)) 6= f(♦, c); (3) θ = (c,♦)
and hence f(α(c,♦)) 6= f(c,♦); or (4) θ = (c, c) and hence f(α(c, c)) 6= f(c, c).
Case 1: If θ = (♦,♦), i.e., f(α(♦,♦)) 6= f(♦,♦): Then, f(α(♦,♦)) = n. Hence, we
must have αA(♦) = αB(♦) = c. Then, θ∗ = θ = (♦,♦) and i∗ = A work since
SA(f, α(θB)) = SA(f, c) = {c, n, s} and n /∈ C(♦,♦)A ({c, n, s}).
Case 2: If θ = (♦, c), i.e., f(α(♦, c)) 6= f(♦, c): Then, f(α(♦, c)) = n. Hence, we
must have αA(♦) = c and αB(c) = c. Then, θ∗ = θ = (♦, c) and i∗ = A work since
SA(f, α(θB)) = SA(f, c) = {c, n, s} and n /∈ C(♦,c)A ({c, n, s}).
Case 3: If θ = (c,♦), i.e., f(α(c,♦)) 6= f(c,♦): Then, f(α(c,♦)) = n. Hence, we
must have αA(c) = c and αB(♦) = c. Then, θ∗ = θ = (c,♦) and i∗ = B work since
SB(f, α(θA)) = SB(f, c) = {c, n, s} and n /∈ C(c,♦)B ({c, n, s}).
Case 4: If θ = (c, c), i.e., f(α(c, c)) 6= f(c, c): Then, f(α(c, c)) = s. Hence, either
αA(c) = ♦ or αB(c) = ♦, or both. We consider these three cases separately:
Subcase 4.1: If αA(c) = ♦ and αB(c) = c: Then, θ∗ = θ = (c, c) and i∗ = A work
since SA(f, α(θB)) = SA(f, c) = {c, n, s} and s /∈ C(c,c)A ({c, n, s}).
Subcase 4.2: If αA(c) = c and αB(c) = ♦: Then, θ∗ = θ = (c, c) and i∗ = B work
since SB(f, α(θA)) = SB(f, c) = {c, n, s} and s /∈ C(c,c)B ({c, n, s}).
Subcase 4.3: If αA(c) = ♦ and αB(c) = ♦: Then, θ∗ = θ = (c, c) and i∗ = A work
since SA(f, α(θB)) = SA(f,♦) = {n, s} and s /∈ C(c,c)A ({n, s}).
Therefore, SA and SB satisfy condition (iii) of Corollary 2 as well.
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